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Out of the Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan?
SelfValidation, MetaExpertise and the
Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye
Jurisdictions
Simon A. Cole*

Increasingly, in contemporary society, regulators,
judges, and others charged with technical decisionmaking are compelled to wrestle with the problem of how
to evaluate claims to expertise.1 Who should count as an
expert, and whose voice should be heard when technical
decisions must be made? Over the past several decades,
it has become clear that there is no easy answer to this
problem. We cannot simply adhere to crude credentialism
—attributing expertise to those with advanced degrees in
the appropriate areas—in part, because all sorts of lay
persons—from AIDS patients to sheep farmers—have
shown that they can acquire and deploy expert knowledge
over even highly technical domains.2 Indeed, it has been
*
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1
. EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAW (Gary Edmond ed. 2004). HARRY COLLINS
& ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE (2007).
2
. Brian Wynne, Sheep Farming after Chernobyl: A Case Study in
Communicating Scientific Information, 31 ENVTL MAGAZINE 33 (1989); STEVEN
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shown that the attribution of expertise itself can be viewed
as sort of strategic, adversarial “game.”3 At the same time,
we surely cannot attribute equal expertise to everyone who
claims to be an expert.4 At some point, technical decision
makers must face the awkward task of adjudicating
expertise—of legitimating some claims to expert knowledge
and delegitimating others. But surely we want such
adjudications to be more than arbitrary; surely, we need
some sort of rational framework for making such
determinations.
Among the technical decision-makers who must
adjudicate claims to expertise are trial judges. In most
American jurisdictions, trial judges are charged with the
task of “gatekeeping,” of legitimating some claims to
expertise—by allowing the expert to testify at a trial—and
delegitimating others—by barring the expert from
testifying. Most American jurisdictions adhere to one of two
general approaches to determining the admissibility of
expert evidence. The first, which Professor Allen has called
“The Deference Model,” holds that trial courts should defer
to an expert community to determine whether a proffered
evidentiary claim is held in high esteem, or “generally
accepted.”5 Professor Brewer has usefully called this
process “practical epistemic deference.”6 This approach is
embodied by the 1923 D.C. Circuit case Frye v. United
States and by many state cases adopting, and in some
cases elaborating on, Frye.7 The second approach, which
has most usefully been termed the “reliability-validity
standard,” directs trial judges to undertake an independent
assessment of the relevance and reliability of a proffered
evidentiary claim.8 This approach is embodied by the 1993
EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996).
3
. Sheila Jasanoff, Expert Games in Silicone Gel Breast Implant
Litigation, in SCIENCE IN COURT 83 (Freeman & Reece eds., 1998).
4
. COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 1.
5
. Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1162 (1994).
6
. Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due
Process, 107 Yale L. J. 1535, 1567 (1998) (“the process of deference by
legal reasoners to experts”).
7
. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also,
e.g., People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249 (Cal. 1976).
8
. DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE 157 (2004).
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United State Supreme Court decision Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals and its progeny cases, General
Electric v. Joiner and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.9
Frye was heavily criticized in its time.10 Daubert has
generated extensive commentary, too large and varied a
literature to summarize here, and some scholars have even
advocated a return to the deferential approach of Frye.11
This paper takes no position on the debate between Frye
and Daubert. It does, however, seek to draw our attention
back to the deferential approach by further exploring some
of the problems in the application of Frye, problems that
scholars have tended to neglect in the last decade and a
half, as attention has shifted to the reliability-validity
approach.
The great advantage of the deference approach has
been its reliance of the collective wisdom of an institution
that commands great epistemic prestige in contemporary
society: what is described in Frye as the “scientific
community.” The approach is broadly consistent with much
of contemporary society’s approach to technical decision
making: Want to know whether nuclear power plants are
safe, whether tobacco causes cancer, whether humaninduced climate change is occurring? Ask an expert. To the
extent that most of us prefer to defer to experts about
important, highly technical decisions, Frye models this
process, rather than, as Daubert does, turning judges into
“amateur scientists,” much as making one’s own medical
decisions turns the layperson into an amateur physician.
Essentially, Frye seeks to replicate the ideal of peer review
in which the consensus judgment of the scientific
community should be considered the best, if not the “true,”
answer to scientific and technical questions. As one
evidence scholar noted, “the ‘real’ issue is whether good

9

. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993);
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1997); Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
10
. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
11
. Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the
Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 149
(1997).
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scientists consider the evidence reliable at this time.”12
But how should the deference model function when the
expert community from which the proffered expert
emanates is not part of what would commonly be
recognized as the scientific community? Frye has famously
been criticized for purportedly allowing astrologers to
testify based on the “general acceptance” of their claims
within the community of astrologers.13 In reality, courts
have dealt with such problems by identifying what we
might call an appropriate reference community, a
community that is commonly recognized as “scientific”
whom the contested experts must convince in order for
their claims to be deemed “generally accepted.” For
example, in the Frye case itself proponents of the systolic
blood pressure test had to convince psychologists and
physiologists that the test was valid. Acceptance within the
community of operators of the test was insufficient.
But what is to be done when the choice of appropriate
reference community is not seemingly self-evident,14 as the
psychological community was for the lie detector? What, for
example, is the appropriate reference community for
astrologers? One might say astronomers, but, in fact,
professional astronomers spend very little time evaluating
the validity of astrologers’ knowledge claims. Instead, the
claimed validity of astrology has been evaluated by an
eclectic group of individuals from a variety of disciplinary
perspectives—psychology, statistics, astronomy—who have
undertaken to rigorously empirically evaluate the claims
made by astrologers.15 In those cases in which courts must
evaluate the validity of claims for which the appropriate
reference community is not obvious, courts have little
alternative but to similarly turn to those individuals who
12

. Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert
and the Law’s Hubris, 43 EMORY L. J. 913, 924 (1994); see also, Schwartz,
supra note 11, at 196.
13
. Michael Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s
Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
1069, 1138 (1998).
14
. I say “seemingly self-evident” because, of course, the choice of
psychologists and physiologists as the “relevant scientific communities”
could have been contested. See TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE,
252 (2004).
15
. For a review, see Guide to Sources, http://www.rudolfhsmit.nl/uguid1.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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have endeavored to evaluate the validity of those claims
from some rational, empirical standpoint. We might call
these individuals, who evaluate the validity of claims made
by other experts, “meta-experts.”
Latent print (or “fingerprint”) identification, this article
will suggest, is one of those cases for which the only way to
find an expert evaluation of the proffered experts’ claims is
to turn to meta-experts. Since the first admissibility
challenge to latent print testimony under Daubert in 1999,
the admissibility of latent print evidence has generated
several legal opinions and a fair amount of legal
scholarship.16 Courts have nearly unanimously found latent
print evidence admissible. Legal scholars have, with an
equal degree of unanimity, found that latent print evidence
fails to satisfy any reasonable application of Daubert and
Kumho
Tire.17
These
discussions,
however,
have
overwhelmingly been oriented around the Daubert
reliability-validity approach. There have been almost no
legal opinions, and no scholarship, assessing the
admissibility of latent print evidence under the Frye
deference approach. This appears to be because of the
widespread assumption that, whereas latent print
individualization evidence’s ability to satisfy Daubert’s
“reliability” requirement may be in question, its ability to
satisfy Frye’s “general acceptance” requirement is not.
Scholars, litigators, and judges appear to have assumed
that the Frye general acceptance standard is satisfied by
the widespread acceptance of the technique by its
numerous practitioners. Some litigators and judges may
have also been assumed that latent print evidence would
evade Frye analysis because it is not novel evidence or
because it is not scientific evidence.
All of these assumptions are false.This article argues
that, in fact, latent print individualization evidence satisfies
neither Daubert nor Frye. Moreover, it suggests that,
contrary to a common assumption among both lawyers and
legal scholars, defendants have equally strong, if not
stronger, arguments for exclusion of latent print evidence
16

. See sources cited infra note 241.
. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint
Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY &
RISK 127 (2008).
17
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under Frye as under Daubert. Thus, latent print evidence
may have escaped the Daubert fire, only to end up in the
Fryeing pan.18
This article has several purposes. First, it outlines a
conceptual basis for challenging latent print evidence in
jurisdictions adhering to Frye-like deference approaches to
the admissibility of expert evidence. These include some of
the largest jurisdictions in the United States.19 In so doing,
the article will further explicate some of the conceptual
difficulties that have long been associated with the
deference approach, especially how to constitute the
“relevant scientific community” and how to measure
“general acceptance.”20 In addition, it addresses hitherto
underexplored conceptual issues raised by the unusual
situation posed by latent print evidence: a non-scientific
expert community offering testimony about what purports
to be scientific evidence without an obvious scientific
community to which a fact-finder can refer for an
assessment of the validity of this testimony. The article
proposes the notion of the meta-expert to describe the ad
hoc reference community that must be constituted in such
a case. In so doing, the article aims to enhance our
understanding of the deference approach to admissibility,
an approach that is currently understudied and
overshadowed by the reliability-validity approach.21 More
broadly, the issue of how to adjudicate competing claims to
expertise—how to decide who properly counts as an expert
—is currently an issue of great interest and great import in
many areas outside of law, concerning technical decisionmaking of all kinds.22 It is hoped that this discussion—f one
peculiar legal problem of adjudicating expertise—can
contribute to that broader discussion as well. Finally, the
18

. I am not the first to make this pun. See John F. Decker & Joel
Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence—Out of the Frye Pan and Into
Admissibility, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 314 (1977); Deborah Maliver, Note, Out of
the Fryeing Pan and Into Daubert: Trial Judges at the Gate Will Not Spell
Relief for Plaintiffs, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 245 (1994); David Bernstein, Note,
Out of the Fryeing Pan and Into the Fire: The Expert Witness Problem in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117 (1990); Ned Miltenberg, Out of the
Fire and into the Fryeing Pan Or Back to the Future, 37 TRIAL 18 (2001).
19
. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
20
. Giannelli, supra, note 10.
21
. But see, Schwartz, supra note 11.
22
. See generally, COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 1.
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article explores some of the larger implications of the
failure of latent print evidence under a deference approach.
The inability of latent print evidence to muster “general
acceptance” in the “relevant scientific community” not only
poses admissibility challenges in both deference and
reliability-validity jurisdictions, but also points to a larger
issue of a fundamental split between the scientific and legal
communities over the necessity of validating expert
evidence.
In Part I of this article, I discuss the background to
latent print admissibility challenges under Frye. In Part II, I
explore two important conceptual issues that have long
troubled the application of Frye: how to constitute the
“relevant scientific community” and how to measure
“general acceptance.” In Part III, I undertake a Frye analysis
of latent print individualization evidence, whereby I find
that latent print individualization is not generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community. In Part IV, I explore
some of the broader implications of this finding beyond the
narrow issue of legal admissibility in Frye jurisdictions.

I.
A. LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE

BACKGROUND

UNDER

TWO ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS

The admissibility of latent print individualization
evidence has been extensively litigated over the past nine
years. Most of this litigation has taken place in jurisdictions
that adhere to what is colloquially known as “the Daubert
standard” for determining the admissibility of expert
evidence. This is the admissibility standard that prevails in
federal court and is articulated by the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the trilogy of Supreme Court cases: Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,23 General Electric v.
Joiner,24 and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.25 The Daubert
trilogy holds that trial judges must ensure that all expert
evidence is both relevant and reliable. It further lays out
five discretionary26 criteria to assist judges in assessing
23
24
25
26

.
.
.
.

509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993).
522 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1997).
526 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1999).
See infra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
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reliability: testing, peer review and publication, standards,
error rate, and general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community.27 In addition to the federal courts, at least
twenty-five states have also adopted the Daubert
standard.28 With some qualified exceptions, challenges to
latent print evidence under the Daubert standard have
been unsuccessful.29
However, there is a second major standard governing
the admissibility of expert evidence in American
jurisdictions. This second standard, colloquially known as
“the Frye rule,” is older and derives from the 1923 D.C.
Circuit case Frye v. United States.30 Frye posits a single test
of admissibility of scientific evidence, which is generally
summarized by the term “general acceptance.” The
relevant language from the Frye opinion is as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.31

A crucial distinction is that Frye, unlike Daubert, posits
a “deference model” for evaluating scientific evidence.32
Whereas Daubert asks the trial court itself to render a
judgment as to whether the proffered evidence is reliable,
Frye directs the court to defer to the judgment of the
“relevant scientific community.” Frye, as Professor
Schwartz has pointed out, assumes that scientists
themselves are the best judges of scientific claims.33 As
such, a judge operating under Frye is not being asked to
form an independent judgment of the reliability of the
technique. Instead, the judge is being asked to engage in a
27

. Alice B. Lustre, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453,
480 (2001).
28
. Id. at 454; see also infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
29
. See Part I. C. infra.
30
. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
31
. Id. at 1014.
32
. Allen, supra note 5.
33
. See
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sort of scientometric34 exercise in which she attempts to
measure the acceptance of the technique among scientists.
This article will endeavor to model the conceptual
process of a Frye inquiry into the admissibility of expert
evidence by latent print examiners. The reader will be put
in the position of a trial judge undertaking such an inquiry.
Consistent with the philosophy of the deference model, I
will deliberately refrain from explaining the nature of
fingerprint evidence and the scientific objections to it.
Strictly speaking, such matters should be outside the
purview of the trial court in a Frye jurisdiction. All the trial
court really needs to know is whether the “relevant
scientific community” accepts the proffered expert’s claim
or not. Strictly speaking, the judge need not even
understand why scientists hold the views they do, as long
as the evidence concerning general acceptance is
convincing. In this article, I attempt to compel the reader to
adopt this mode of reasoning by deliberately withholding
technical explanations or objections to fingerprint evidence.
There are numerous sources through which the interested
reader may learn why scientists and scholars do not accept
the claims of latent print examiners.35
34

. “Scientometrics,” a variant of bibliometrics, is a field which,
among other things, seeks to measure the influence of particular scientific
publications by the amount of citations. See generally Helmut A. Abt, Do
Important Papers Produce High Citation Counts?, 48 SCIENTOMETRICS 65
(2000).
35
. See generally 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2007) [hereinafter MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE]; Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid?
Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse, 28 LAW & POL’Y
109 (2006) [hereinafter Cole, Fingerprint Identification]; Robert Epstein,
Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” is Revealed,
75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002); Lyn Haber & Ralph Haber, Scientific
Validation of Fingerprint Evidence under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY, & RISK
87 (2008); Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie? Re-weighing
Fingerprint Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2003);
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence In An Age of DNA Profiling, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence];
Katherine Schwinghammer, Fingerprint Identification: How “The Gold
Standard Of Evidence” Could Be Worth Its Weight, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 265
(2005); Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143 (2005).
For defenses of latent print identification, see CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD ET AL.,
FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER RIDGE SKIN IMPRESSIONS (2004); André Moenssens,
Fingerprint Identification: A Valid Reliable “Forensic Science”?, 18 CRIM.
JUST. 31 (2003).
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Although Daubert is generally perceived as the wave of
the future, reports of Frye’s demise36 may be exaggerated.
There are still at least twelve states that adhere to some
form of the Frye rule, and “Frye states” still include some of
the nation’s largest jurisdictions (e.g., California, New York,
Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania).37 Six additional states have
incorporated Daubert factors but continue to adhere to
Frye.38 Moreover, while many legal scholars have criticized
Daubert, some have gone so far as to praise the
“philosophical insight” of the Frye rule and called for its
reinstatement in all jurisdictions.39

B. THE ASSUMPTION

OF

ADMISSIBILITY

UNDER

FRYE

When criminal defendants began litigating admissibility
challenges to latent print evidence in 1999, it was widely
assumed that such challenges were only possible under
Daubert. Daubert, it was argued, had opened a door to
reconsideration of the admissibility of latent print evidence,
a door that had been closed under Frye.40 There were a
number of reasons for this assumption, but in this article, I
will argue that this assumption (an assumption I shared as
well) may have been premature.
36

. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND
RESEARCH ISSUES 7–10 (2002) (noting “[t]he Decline of Frye” and citing
“increasing” use of the Daubert standard, but acknowledging that Frye
“remains the standard by which science is evaluated for courtroom use in
many jurisdictions”). See also Richard Friedman, The Death and
Transfiguration of Frye, 34 JURIMETRICS 133 (1994).
37
.
38
. In addition to the federal courts, the Daubert jurisdictions are:
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming. The Frye
jurisdictions are: Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Florida,
Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. States which combine Frye and Daubert
approaches are: Alabama, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Hampshire, and New Jersey. States with their own admissibility rules are:
Georgia, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. States that have a split of
authority supporting both Frye and Daubert approaches are: Michigan,
Mississippi, and Nebraska. Id.
39
.
40
. Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases,
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1098 (2003) (“such challenges would not have
occurred under Frye.”).
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First, Daubert demands that expert evidence
demonstrate not only relevance but also reliability. The
demand for a demonstration of reliability was thought to
pose greater difficulties than the “general acceptance”
requirement for latent print individualization evidence,
especially when the criminal defense bar became aware
that there were in fact no studies demonstrating the
reliability of latent print individualization.41 By this time,
legal scholars had begun to note the apparent irony that
Daubert, which had explicitly stated that it was intended to
loosen the restrictions on expert evidence, in fact,
appeared to be a more stringent standard.42 Professor Saks
argued that which standard was more exacting depended
on the type of evidence.43 Some forms of evidence, such as
very cutting edge scientific results, might have high
reliability but low general acceptance. Such evidence was
more likely to be admitted under Daubert than Frye. Others
enjoyed high general acceptance, but had little or no
evidence demonstrating reliability. Such evidence was
more likely to be admitted under Frye than Daubert.
Professor Saks included latent print evidence (along with
much of the rest of the trace evidence forensic sciences)44
in this category, and his analysis no doubt did much to
inform many legal actors’ assumptions (including mine)
that challenges to latent print individualization evidence
were unlikely to be successful in Frye jurisdictions.
Consistent with the Saksian view, most legal scholars
believed that latent print individualization evidence had
difficulties under four of the five Daubert reliability criteria.
In most cases, however, an exception was made for general
acceptance. Some legal scholars conceded that latent print
evidence probably satisfied the general acceptance
criterion.45 Some admissibility challenges to latent print
evidence, in fact, conceded the general acceptance prong.
41

.
. E.g.,
43
. Id.
44
. Trace evidence forensic sciences would include such disciplines as
fingerprinting, tool mark identification, bite mark identification, forensic
DNA profiling, microscopic hair and fiber comparison, forensic document
examination, and footwear analysis. Id. at 1094–1127.
45
. See generally However, some attorneys have noted that latent
print evidence enjoys acceptance only among practitioners.
42
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Nevertheless, this concession was not thought to affect the
overall admissibility of latent print evidence. First, proffered
expert evidence that met only one of five criteria would
seem to be a poor candidate for admissibility. Second, as
the Supreme Court noted in Kumho Tire, general
acceptance alone is usually insufficient to render evidence
admissible “where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as,
for example, do theories grounded in any so-called
generally
accepted
principles
of
astrology
or
necromancy.”46 This reasoning guided, for example, the
initial ruling (later vacated) in United States v. Llera Plaza,
restricting the admissibility of latent print evidence.47
Most importantly, it has generally been assumed that
an analysis of the state of general acceptance of latent
print individualization evidence is something of a “nobrainer.”48 The “relevant scientific community” is latent
print examiners. All latent print examiners “accept” latent
print evidence. End of argument. Many courts have
concluded that latent print evidence easily satisfies the
general acceptance requirement, even when evincing
skepticism about its ability to satisfy some of the other
Daubert criteria.49 I will argue, however, that this is an
overly simplistic analysis within the meaning of Frye.
The final reason for assuming that Frye challenges to
latent print evidence were not possible is a phrase in the
Frye opinion that specifies that it applies to novel scientific
evidence.50 This creates what some evidence scholars have
called a non-novelty “loophole” in Frye.51 Forms of expert
evidence which either: (1) pre-date Frye altogether (as in
46

. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
. United States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza I), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492,
515 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“The
failure of fingerprint identifications fully to satisfy the first three Daubert
factors militates against heavy reliance on the general acceptance
factor.”).
48
. United States v. Gary, 85 F. App’x. 908 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“[F]ingerprint analysis is one of those forms of evidence where the
reliability of the science and its general acceptance is apparent without a
full reexamination of the science.”).
49
. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D.
Ky. 2003) (“The ACE-V methodology easily satisfies the general
acceptance factor of Daubert.”).
50
. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
51
. Giannelli, supra note 40, at 1099.
47
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the case of latent print individualization evidence), or (2)
post-date Frye, but are not challenged until after they have
become familiar enough to the criminal justice system to no
longer be regarded as “novel,” would not be challengeable
under Frye. Such forms of expert evidence would not even
reach the general acceptance issue. Because Daubert
explicitly disavowed any novelty requirement,52 it was
widely assumed that challenges were more possible under
Daubert.53
For these reasons, the criminal defense bar and legal
scholars alike have assumed that challenging latent print
individualization evidence under Frye is a hopeless cause,
while admissibility challenges under Daubert are, at least in
principle, plausible. Litigants wishing to challenge the
admissibility of latent print individualization evidence in
Frye jurisdictions have generally adopted the tactic of
trying to backdoor Daubert by urging courts to consider the
Daubert factors in making their Frye determinations.54 Such
tactics have not met with success.

C. DAUBERT CHALLENGES

TO

LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE

Daubert challenges to latent print evidence have not
met with success either. Numerous published opinions have
ruled on admissibility challenges to latent print evidence in
Daubert jurisdictions.55 With some qualified exceptions,
these opinions have all ruled latent print individualization
evidence admissible. Indeed, even the qualified exceptions
generally rule latent print individualization evidence in
general admissible, while excluding some specific
application of it.56
52

. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11
(1993) (“Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on ‘novel’
scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to
apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence.”).
53
. Giannelli, supra note 40, at 1098.
54
. See, e.g., People v. Clevenger, 2003 WL 22872446 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
55
. For a review, see One web site lists more than 40 Daubert
challenges to latent print evidence, not all of which are published. See
Legal
Challenges
to
Fingerprints,
http://www.onin.com/fp/daubert_links.html (last visited May 24, 2008).
56
. Legal Challenges to Fingerprints, http://www.onin.com/fp/daubert_
links.html (last visited May 24, 2008).
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This lack of success has been at stark odds with the
weight of opinion in legal scholarship, nearly all of which
concludes that latent print individualization evidence, as
currently constituted, does not satisfy the Daubert standard
for admissibility.57 Although I believe that latent print
individualization evidence must be inadmissible under any
reasonable reading of Daubert,58 it now appears that a
litigant may, contrary to conventional wisdom, have a
better chance of success in a motion to exclude latent print
evidence in a Frye jurisdiction.
There are several reasons for this. First, at some point
the precedential weight of the admissibility rulings will
preclude admissibility motions under Daubert. Already, in
2004, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals tried not so subtly
to put this issue to rest in its opinion upholding the
admissibility of latent print individualization evidence.59
Second, the Daubert standard is notoriously vague. Indeed,
vagueness is one of the opinion’s principal flaws for its
many critics.60 The vagueness of the Daubert standard
principally lies, first, in the refusal to specify the five
“Daubert factors” as a “definitive checklist or test.” Second,
trial court decisions are subject to the abuse of discretion
review.61 These factors combine to create a regime in which
trial judges can follow their intuitions with very little risk of
being overturned. It is very difficult for a trial court to err
under Daubert because most decisions with which higher
courts may disagree can be explained as either exercises of
the trial judge’s discretion in framing the Daubert inquiry or
exercises of the trial judge’s discretion in making the
57

. Infra note 241.
. See Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint
Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (2004) [hereinafter Cole, Grandfathering].
59
. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004). (“[A]
district court would not abuse its discretion by limiting, in a proper case,
the scope of a Daubert hearing to novel challenges to the admissibility of
latent fingerprint identification evidence—or even dispensing with the
hearing altogether if no novel challenge was raised.”); Simon A. Cole,
Does ‘Yes’ Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close Debate on the
Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICS 449, 452 (2005)
[hereinafter Cole, Yes].
60
. See, e.g., John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28
ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 45 (1996).
61
. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 136–37 (1997).
58
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ultimate admissibility determination. It has been suggested
that Daubert challenges to latent print evidence have failed
not because there has been any empirical demonstration of
the technique’s accuracy or validity, but because latent
print evidence benefits from a high degree of what
comedian Stephen Colbert has called “truthiness,” an
instinctual belief that something is true even if no factual
basis for that belief exists.62 In other words, perhaps trial
judges believe that latent print evidence is accurate, even if
the proponents of the evidence cannot demonstrate it, and,
therefore, they are inclined to look for ways to find that the
evidence satisfies Daubert. If latent print admissibility
rulings are indeed outcome oriented, then a vague
admissibility standard with a wide range of judicial
discretion gives judges more room to follow their instincts.
Thus, a vague standard like Daubert is not conducive for
unpopular litigants seeking a radical change like restricting
the admissibility of latent print individualization evidence.63
This point is supported by the recent Daubert
jurisprudence on latent print evidence admissibility. The
earliest opinions tended to adopt tortured readings of the
Daubert factors in order to find that latent print evidence
met all the factors with flying colors.64 More recent
decisions, however, tend to find latent print evidence
admissible despite what would appear to be shocking
lapses in terms of the Daubert factors. For example, United
States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza II) finds latent print
62

. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 35, at 66 (“It is easy to
see why judges are reluctant to exclude fingerprinting: it is a long-used
technique, an extremely valuable form of evidence to prosecutors, and
one in which the public has enormous faith.”); Jacques Steinberg,
Truthiness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005.
63
. The vagueness of Daubert has been exacerbated, I would argue,
by the five-factor list. The list has drawn both judicial and scholarly
attention away from the concept it was meant to elucidate: “reliability.”
By focusing on the list, which is vague and which the Daubert Court had
specified was not intended to be “definitive,” rather than on the Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE) relevance and reliability requirement, which is
neither flexible nor vague, judges and scholars have overstated the
flexibility and vagueness of Daubert. If Daubert rulings are outcomeoriented, the outcome is usually achieved by interpreting the five-factor
list, not the FRE reliability requirement.
64
. Michael J. Saks, Reliability Standards: Too High, Too Low, or Just
Right? The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially
Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167 (2003).
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evidence
admissible
despite
satisfying
only
the
standards/error rate and general acceptance prongs.65
United States v. Sullivan found it admissible despite being
“testable, although untested.”66 Finally, United States v.
Mitchell found it admissible despite failing the standards
prong and meeting the testing prong not with true testing,
but only with “implicit testing.”67 None of these opinions
have won praise among evidence scholars, and one could
make a strong argument that they are erroneous
applications of Daubert. But, in the final analysis, it is
difficult to say that these opinions are absolute violations of
Daubert, rather than the “flexible” interpretations of it that
that Supreme Court seemed to call for.
The Frye general acceptance test, though it too
contains unresolved ambiguities,68 is at least less flexible
and vague than Daubert. Indeed, Frye has been criticized
for the supposed rigidity of its “nose counting” test.69
However, as I will argue below, properly conducted, a nose
counting test actually favors criminal defendants.
Unpopular litigants with unpopular causes like latent print
admissibility challenges should want a rigid admissibility
standard that leaves the court with less discretion.

D. “THE THING FROM WHICH THE DEDUCTION IS MADE”: WHAT MUST BE
“GENERALLY ACCEPTED”?
The first step in analyzing latent print individualization
under Frye is defining what it is that needs to be generally
accepted. A general acceptance analysis might yield quite
different results depending on how the claim is formulated.
To use the original Frye case as an example, a court that
asked whether the ability of a lie detector device to
accurately detect deception is generally accepted would
65

. 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (concluding that
arrangements found sufficiently reliable in England should be found
reliable in the United States).
66
. United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky.
2003).
67
. 365 F.3d at 238; see also Simon A. Cole, ‘Implicit Testing’: Can
Casework Validate Forensic Techniques?, 46 JURIMETRICS 117, 126 (2006)
[hereinafter Cole, Implicit Testing].
68
. See, e.g.,
69
. Joseph D. Hatina, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Who Are the True
Experts?, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557, 572 n.125 (1998).
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get quite a different result from a court that asked whether
the lie detector’s utility in exacting confessions was
generally accepted.70 Similarly, a court that asked whether
the ability of a lie detector to detect deception some of the
time was generally accepted would find quite a different
result than a court that asked whether the ability of a lie
detector to detect deception with a high degree of accuracy
was generally accepted. In the case of latent print
evidence, a court might find a very high rate of general
acceptance if it asked whether the “relevant scientific
community” accepts that latent print identification is a
“good” or “useful” thing or that latent print identification is
“sometimes” or “often” accurate or “can” be done
accurately. Similarly, the proposition that latent print
source attributions are to be made accurately from
complete sets of ten rolled prints might enjoy an extremely
high rate of general acceptance, whereas the proposition
that latent print source attributions are made accurately
from single partial “latent” prints might command a far
lower rate of general acceptance.
How then should “the thing from which the deduction is
made” be formulated in a Frye challenge to latent print
evidence? Given that it is possible to “game” the state of
general acceptance through the formulation of the
proposition to be accepted, it would seem that the only fair
way to proceed is to evalaute the formulation to which the
proffered expert witness proposes to testify. In this regard,
courts faced with Frye challenges to latent print evidence
are fortunate because the professional community of latent
print examiners is quite explicit about what it is that they
claim to be able to do. According to professional guidelines,
inculpatory latent print testimony can take only one form: a
testimonial claim of “individualization,” which is defined as
the conclusion that the source of the known print (the
defendant) is the only possible source of a latent print, to
the exclusion of all other possible sources in the universe.71
70

. See generally KEN ALDER, THE LIE DETECTORS: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN
OBSESSION (2007).
71
. SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECHNOLOGY,
FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINATION METHODOLOGY FOR LATENT PRINT EXAMINERS 3 (2002),
available
at
http://www.swgfast.org/Friction_
Ridge_Examination_Methodology_for_Latent_Print_Examiners_1.01.pdf.
[hereinafter SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP, FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINATION].
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This is the strongest possible conclusion that any forensic
analyst could offer in regard to the source of a trace, and
latent print examiners offer it every time they testify to an
inculpation. The ability of latent print analysis to
individualize, then, is the “thing” from which the deduction
that the defendant is the source of the latent print to
exclusion of all other possible sources is made. Therefore, it
is the ability of latent print analysis to individualize that,
under Frye, needs to be generally accepted in the “relevant
scientific community.”72
It is often suggested, however, that it is the underlying
“premises” of the technique, not the accuracy of the
technique itself, which must be generally accepted. A
common tactic in both admissibility hearings and in latent
print examiners’ own literature has been to advance
evidence supporting the “premises” of latent print
individualization instead of evidence supporting the
accuracy of the technique itself.73 Specifically, in
admissibility hearings, the government has spent a great
deal of time demonstrating the “uniqueness” and
“permanence” of friction ridge skin (the anatomical
structure of which finger, palm, and sole prints are
impressions), rather than the accuracy of latent print
individualization. Could it be that “the thing from which the
deduction is made” is the uniqueness of all human friction
ridge skin? It cannot. The conclusion that a single area of
friction ridge skin is the only possible source of a particular
latent print is not a logical deduction from the proposition
that all friction ridge skin is unique. Just because the skin is
unique, it does not follow that an analytic process is
sufficiently diagnostic to always identify the true source of
an impression of that unique skin.
72

. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Some
readers of this article have questioned why I have not formulated “the
thing” more generously in a way that would command higher general
acceptance.
I must admit to being somewhat perplexed by this
suggestion, given that the latent print community has the full capacity to
formulate its claim, however it so chooses. It is certainly true that there
would probably be a high rate of general acceptance if the claim were
formulated as follows: “latent print analysis can correctly attribute source
for complete sets of prints.” But this is not how the latent print
community and those who proffer latent print examiners as expert
witnesses have formulated the claim.
73
.
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Moreover, as a matter of common sense, legal scholars
and at least one court74 have noted that it would defy
common sense to allow acceptance of the underlying
“premises” of the technique to be sufficient for
admissibility; surely the issue in a Frye inquiry is not merely
whether the premises of the technique are generally
accepted but also whether or not it is generally accepted
that the technique itself does what it claims to be able to
do.75

II. CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE
APPLICATIONS OF FRYE
The Frye rule has come under frequent criticism over
the years. Scholars have argued that applying the Frye rule
is not nearly as clear-cut as it might appear at first glance.
Two difficulties applying Frye, in particular, have generated
concern. One is how the “relevant scientific community” is
defined. The second is how “general acceptance” is
measured.76
A. CONSTITUTING

THE

“RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY”

Critics of Frye have pointed out that the “relevant
scientific community” is not always obvious.77 For example,
situations may arise in which one specialist community
“accepts” a particular principle or technique, while another
74

. State v. Velasco, 799 P.2d 821, 827 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc) (“The
question is not whether the scientific community has concluded that the
scientific principle or process is absolutely perfect, but whether the
principle or process is generally accepted to be capable of doing what it
purports to do.”).
75
. On the distinction between the validity of a technique and the
theory behind it, see See also (“For testimony to be sufficiently
probative to warrant admission . . . the fundamental theory and the
existence of a valid procedure for taking the necessary measurements
and drawing the appropriate inferences needs to be established.”). The
uniqueness of all human friction ridge skin may logically count as a
“premise” of latent print individualization—it is a necessary but not
sufficient condition of the claim of individualization—but I would question
its status as a “theory.” The claim of uniqueness does not purport to
explain how or why analyses by latent print examiners result in
individualization, it merely proposes that the targets of their analyses are
“unique.”
76
. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH
ISSUES 8 (2002).
77
.
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specialist community is more skeptical. Such “cases of
extra-disciplinary competition of credentialed experts” may
take several forms.78 In some cases, acceptance may be
greater in one discipline than in another. In other cases, the
disagreement may pit a practitioner community against a
community of scientists.79

1. Practitioners Only
Can a technique satisfy the Frye rule if it is accepted by
practitioners, but not by the broader scientific community?
The Frye case itself, as well as subsequent cases
concerning polygraph evidence, were practitioner-only
cases. Practitioners of lie detector tests “accepted” them as
valid, whereas the broader scientific community, defined
variously as psychologists, physiologists, or neurologists,
was more skeptical. This was also the case in voice
spectrography cases, in which practitioners of the
technique accepted it as valid, whereas the scientific
community, consisting of audiologists, acousticians, speech
scientists, acoustical engineers, anatomists, electrical
engineers, linguists, phoneticists, physicists, physiologists,
psychologists, and statisticians, was more skeptical.80 In
such cases, if the “relevant scientific community” was
defined as the practitioner community, the technique
appeared to be generally accepted, but if the “relevant
scientific community” was defined as the broader scientific
community, it may not have been.81 Thus, as Professors
Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and Sanders have pointed out, how
the “relevant scientific community” is defined determined
the outcome of the Frye inquiry in every voice
spectrography case.82
By and large, however, there is little disagreement on
the issue of whether practitioners alone can constitute the
“relevant scientific community.” Courts have generally
78

. Brewer, supra note 6, at 1633.
. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 97 139 (1984).
80
. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 296 n.4
(2002) [hereinafter, FAIGMAN, FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES].
81
. Id. at 297.
82
. Id.; Giannelli, supra note 10, at 1214 (noting that “general
acceptance of the polygraph is almost assured if the opinions of
[polygraph] examiners are considered”).
79
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found that practitioner-only acceptance cannot satisfy the
Frye rule. In Frye itself, the systolic blood pressure test
failed because it was not generally accepted “among
physiological and psychological authorities,” rather than,
say, being admitted because it was accepted by William
Moulton Marston, its developer, and his disciples.83
Maryland’s case adopting the Frye rule, Reed v. State,
chided the trial court for restricting the “relevant scientific
community” to “the group actually engaged in the use of
this technique and in the experimentation with this
technique.”84 The court wrote:
[W]e find that the trial court’s formulation is inconsistent with the
proper standard of acceptance necessary for admissibility. The
circumstances of the instant case suggest no basis for “restricting
the relevant field of experts” to those who have performed
voiceprint experiments, and eliminating from consideration the
opinions of those scientists in the fields of speech and hearing, as
well as related fields, who, by training and education, are
competent to make professional judgments concerning
experiments undertaken by others. The purpose of the Frye test is
defeated by an approach which allows a court to ignore the
informed opinions of a substantial segment of the scientific
community which stands in opposition to the process in
question.85

The Arizona Supreme Court agreed.86
The Alaska courts have not only included nonpractitioners in the “relevant scientific community,” but
have even excluded practitioners. In Contreras v. State,
regarding hypnosis, the Supreme Court of Alaska wrote:
We define the relevant scientific community as the academic,
scientific, and medical or health-care professions which have
studied and/or utilized hypnosis for clinical, therapeutic, research
and investigative applications. It does not include those whose
involvement with hypnosis is strictly limited to that of practitioner,
technician or “operator” . . . . We exclude technicians from the
group because Frye requires scientific, not merely technical,
judgments to be made.87
83

. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (Md. 1978).
85
. Id.
86
. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1285 (Ariz.
1982) (“This requirement is not satisfied with testimony from a single
expert or group of experts who personally believe the challenged
procedure is accepted or is reliable.”).
87
. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska 1986); see also
Trout-Clark v. State, No. A-4666, 1993 WL 13157037, *4 (Alaska App. Oct.
84
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The courts’ rationale for evincing skepticism concerning
techniques that are accepted only by practitioners appears
to have been motivated principally by two concerns. First,
practitioners tend to be materially interested in the validity
of the technique. That is, they tend to stand to benefit
financially if the technique is legitimated by a favorable
admissibility ruling in the courts. Therefore, such
individuals’ “acceptance” of the technique should be taken
with a grain of salt. For example, a Florida District Court of
Appeal excluded polygraph evidence because “[t]he only
testimony was from two people who earn a living by giving
polygraph tests.”88 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Michigan
stated
While one would not want an expert witness without experience
or background in the technical field, one would want, where the
task was to demonstrate general scientific acceptability, an
acknowledgment of the value of the device and the techniques by
disinterested scientists whose livelihood was not intimately
connected with it.89

In a later case, the court stated:
To allow general scientific acceptance to be established on the
testimony alone of witnesses whose livelihood is intimately
connected with a new technique would eliminate the safeguard of
scientific community approval implicit in the general scientific
acceptance test. Scientific community approval is absent where
those who have developed and whose reputation and livelihood
20, 1993) (excluding horizontal gaze nystagmus evidence because
testimony of practitioner did not suffice for general acceptance in
relevant scientific community); Halley v. State, No. A3463, 1991 WL
11650674, *3 (Alaska App. Jan. 16, 1991) (excluding preliminary breath
test evidence because testimony of practitioner did not suffice for general
acceptance in relevant scientific community); Haakanson v. State, 760
P.2d 1030, 1034 (Alaska App. 1988) (finding polygraph evidence failed to
satisfy Frye because polygraph examiner, in contrast to defendant’s
expert, a Psychology Professor, was not member of the relevant scientific
community). Alaska has since adopted Daubert. See State v. Coon, 974
P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1999).
88
. State v. Thompkins, 891 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2005).
89
. People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Mich. 1977); see also
People v. Coy, 669 N.W.2d 831, 838 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (per curium)
(“When demonstrating that there is general scientific recognition of novel
scientific techniques or principles, it is necessary to present the testimony
of disinterested and impartial experts whose livelihood is not intimately
connected with the technique at issue.”); Collins, 644 P.2d at 1285
(“Acceptance must be by those experts who are relatively disinterested
and impartial and whose livelihood, therefore, is not intimately connected
with approval of the technique.”).
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depends on use of the new technique alone certify, in effect selfcertify, the validity of the technique . . . . If this Court were to
adopt the view that the testimony of persons who have developed
and whose reputation and livelihood depends on the use of a new
technique alone supports admissibility, then the views of the
developer and his disciples would be substituted for the scrutiny
of the marketplace of general scientific opinion and the substance
of the Frye test would be eliminated.90

Courts have also recognized, however, that even beside
financial interest, practitioners are vulnerable to developing
a personal stake in the validity of a technique. Having spent
a great deal of their professional time on developing,
learning, disseminating, or advocating the technique,
practitioners may find it very difficult to simply concede
that the technique is not valid, no matter what the
empirical evidence. As the Florida court went on to say
about polygraph evidence, “Frye requires more than the
testimony of an expert who has a personal stake in the
theory or is prone to an institutional bias.”91 In People v.
Kelly, the Supreme Court of California viewed the testimony
of a leading practitioner of voice spectrography with
caution because “he has virtually built his career on the
reliability of the technique.”92 A California appellate court in
an earlier case went further, arguing, as had the Alaska
Supreme Court, to exclude practitioners from the “relevant
scientific community,” stating that in deciding whether “a
technique or process is generally accepted in the scientific
community,
self-serving
opinions
should
not
be
received . . .”93
About the idea of allowing practitioners to constitute
the “relevant scientific community,” the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals said this: “[s]ome commentators have posited
the argument that the polygraph need only attain general
acceptance among the polygraph operators themselves to
satisfy the test for admissibility . . . . This position must be
rejected.”94 Instead, the court suggested that courts might
turn to the mainstream scientific community: “Experts in
neurology, psychiatry and physiology may offer needed
90

. People v. Young, 391 N.W.2d 270, 276 n.24 (Mich. 1986)
(emphasis added).
91
. Thompkins, 891 So.2d at 1152.
92
. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249 (Cal. 1976).
93
. People v. King, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
94
. United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975).
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enlightenment upon the basic premises of polygraphy.”95
The Third Circuit also noted disapprovingly “some courts,
when they wish to admit evidence, are able to limit the
impact of Frye by narrowing the “relevant scientific
community” to those experts who customarily employ the
technique at issue.”96 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court
noted, “[i]n applying the Frye criteria, general scientific
recognition requires the testimony of impartial experts or
scientists. It is this independent and impartial proof of
general scientific acceptability that provides the necessary
Frye foundation.”97
Significantly, although some courts have functionally
narrowed the “relevant scientific community,” most
commonly in cases upholding the admissibility of voice
spectrography, in almost none of those cases have courts
defended or even articulated limiting the “relevant
scientific community” to practitioners as a principle.98 One
exception is the Minnesota Supreme Court, which disagreed
with the Michigan Supreme Court’s insistence on relying on
relatively disinterested experts.99 There are also some
cases in which evidence is deemed admissible when it “has
obtained general acceptance in only one branch of
science,” such as techniques that are accepted only in
forensic chemistry, but not in chemistry generally.100 Such
situations are quite different from the situation for latent
prints, in which the technique is only accepted, not by a
“branch of science,” but by practitioners of the technique,
95

. Id.
. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985).
97
. Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 851 (Fla. 2001).
98
. See, e.g., Hodo v. Superior Court, Riverside County, 106 Cal. Rptr.
547 passim (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671
passim (Mass. 1975); People v. Bein, 453 N.Y.S.2d 343 passim (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1982); United States v. Maivia, 728 F. Supp. 1471 passim (D. Haw.
1990).
99
. State v. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Minn. 1989) (“The Young
decision is flawed from the Minnesota perspective because of the court’s
requirement that witnesses qualified to testify as members of the relevant
scientific community must be ‘disinterested and impartial’ experts whose
‘livelihood [is] not intimately connected with the new technique.’ . . .
Minnesota’s interpretation of Frye requires ‘experts in its field’ and has no
such narrow requirement of disinterestedness.”).
100
. See Robinson v. State, 425 A.2d 211, 220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1981).
96
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the vast majority of whom do not have scientific training.101
To be sure, courts have acknowledged that a balance
must be struck between finding experts who are
knowledgeable with the technique and those who are
disinterested. A completely disinterested expert may lack
knowledge.102 Therefore, courts have required only relative
disinterest.103 The point here is merely that it is well
established that courts have reason for skepticism when
general acceptance emanates only from practitioners with
a degree of both financial and emotional interest in the
101

. Latent print examiners themselves do not appear to be scientists,
at least in the conventional sense of being trained in, and acquiring
advanced degrees in, science. Historically, latent print examiners have
been drawn from the ranks of law enforcement officers and identification
bureau clerks, and scientific training was not a credential required to
analyze latent prints. David L. Grieve, The Identification Process:
Traditions in Training, 40 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 195 passim (1990). Even
today, after the profession instituted formal educational requirements—
perhaps in response to criticisms of the lack of training standards
exposed in early Daubert challenges—SWGFAST guidelines only
recommend a bachelor’s degree in science. Work experience can still
compensate for the lack of such a degree, according to SWGFAST. Since
the SWGFAST guidelines are not binding on law enforcement agencies
and are of recent origin, many practicing latent print examiners may fall
short of even these modest scientific credentials.
Even if latent print examiners did all possess SWGFAST’s
recommended credential, the B.S. degree, it is not clear that they would
properly be considered scientists. Most working scientists would probably
want to see an advanced degree in science before calling an individual a
“scientist.” Although, I am aware of a handful of individual latent print
examiners who possess such degree, it would seem that they are a small
minority in the profession. One study found that only 3% of crime
laboratory directors require a M.S. degree for a position as a firearms,
document, or fingerprint examiner, and only 2% require a Ph.D. Kenneth
G. Furton et al., What Educational Background Do Crime Laboratory
Directors Require from Applicants, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI. 128, 131 (1999).
Moreover, it appears likely that these credential requirements may reflect
crime laboratory directors’ aspirations more than the true credentials
available to them in the labor market. It is difficult to imagine a crime
laboratory requiring a Ph.D. for a position in firearms, document, or
fingerprint examination, and it is equally difficult to imagine them
successfully filling the position with such an individual. I am not aware of
any latent print examiner who has this credential, though I am aware of
one individual who is seeking a doctoral degree in forensic science (Glenn
Langenburg of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. Trial
Transcript, State v. Columbus, No. 04082599 (Minn. Hennepin County
Dist. Ct. May 18, 2006).).
To be sure, it is possible to argue that latent print examiners are
credential-less scientists. We would not necessarily want to take the
position that an individual or group of individuals who are clearly doing
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perpetuation of the technique.
Evidence scholars also agree that practitioner
communities alone cannot satisfy the general acceptance
requirement. Professor Black notes that such definitions of
the relevant scientific community would “allow[] a group
that advocates a technique or method to self-validate it
simply by declaring acceptance.”104 This would also allow
self-validation by astrologers, cults, and what Professor
Schwartz colorfully calls “mutual admiration societ[ies].”105
Professor Schwartz notes that if the “relevant scientific
community”
consists
solely
of
individuals
whose
“professional reputations and commercial interests . . .
depend on validation of the technique, general acceptance
may be a foregone conclusion . . . .”106 Specifically with
scientific work, but lack formal advanced degrees, could not be
considered scientists.
For example, there are talented amateur
astronomers who make what are considered by professional astronomers
to be genuine contributions to astronomical knowledge. For these
exceptional individuals, their lack of a doctoral degree in astronomy does
not negate their contribution to the corpus of scientific knowledge. Some
latent print examiners have invoked this argument, claiming that a
scientist is one who analyzes and compares. Simon A. Cole, What Counts
for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of Latent
Fingerprint Identification, 12 SCI. CONTEXT 139, 144 (1999). Whatever the
merits of this argument for latent print examiners, it does not help the
court performing a Frye inquiry. The inquiry would still be hampered by
the absence of a relevant scientific community, which would legitimate
latent print examiners’ scientific claims in the way that professional
astronomers legitimate the claims of talented amateur astronomers.
It might perhaps be argued that latent print examiners constitute a
credential-less scientific community that lacks affirmation from a
conventionally credentialed scientific community. The trouble is, it is not
clear how a court would distinguish such a community from, say, a
community of like-minded practitioners united by financial interest in the
perpetuation of their technique and the deluded belief that the technique
“works.” I am not suggesting here that latent print examiners are one
type of community or the other; merely that a proper Frye inquiry
requires a heuristic for distinguishing one from the other.
102
. This is an old problem in the sociology of knowledge. See
generally, JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (1971).
103
. People v. Young, 391 N.W.2d 270, 275 (Mich. 1986) (“A certain
degree of ‘interest’ must be tolerated if scientists familiar with the theory
and practice of a new technique are to testify at all.”).
104
. Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 595, 633 (1988).
105
.
106
. Id. at 207; see also Jay P. Kesan, A Critical Examination of the
Post-Daubert Scientific Evidence Landscape, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 240
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regard to latent print individualization, Professor Mnookin
notes, “[w]hen there is challenge to the fundamental
reliability of a technique through which the practitioners
make their living, there is good reason to be especially
dubious about ‘general acceptance’” in that community.107
As three evidence scholars note in a prominent treatise:
[A] practitioner-only rule could leave an entire field largely
immune from appropriate criticism. The practice of handwriting
analysis, for example, is conducted by those who believe in it. The
only plausible experts who can testify critically on the reliability of
handwriting analysis are analysts who have developed second
thoughts, the few academics who have conducted experimental
studies of handwriting analysis, or the potentially greater number
of academics who have studied the literature on the validity of
handwriting analysis.108

Instead, they suggest, “[a] requirement of acceptance
among ‘disinterested scientists’ helps ensure that the
community in which acceptance is determined consists of
more than a handful of devotees of the theory or technique
in question.”109 Elsewhere, they note:
Constricting the scientific community to forensic scientists is not
an adequate solution. As a formal matter, it resolves the problem
of applying the general acceptance test to “forensic-only”
evidence, but this limited acceptance does not necessarily
demonstrate that the scientific theories or techniques can be
relied on in court. . . . [I]f crime laboratories adopt a method
before it has been adequately validated, this version of “general
acceptance” will not detect the gap in the scientific foundation for
the expert testimony.110

2. Breadth
“Cases of extra-disciplinary competition of credentialed
experts” may also arise when a specialist community
“accepts” a principle or technique, but the broader

(1997) (“[T]he technique always will be deemed reliable and valid if the
inquiry is limited to practitioners of the technique.”).
107
. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 35, at 63.
108
.
Everything in this passage applies equally well to latent print
evidence, with the exception that the number of academics who have
conducted experimental studies may be even smaller.
109
. Id. at 180. I would suggest that there is no good reason to think
that the principle would not still apply even if, as in the case of latent
print evidence, the devotees number more than a “handful.”
110
. Id. at 443.
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community is less convinced.111 Sociologists of science have
shown that it is not uncommon for a small community close
to a particular problem to have a different consensus view
than the broader disciplinary community more conceptually
distant from a problem.112 For example, the state of
“general acceptance” of certain scientific knowledge claims
would be quite different among physicists who work with
gravity-wave detectors than among physicists in general.
Both groups are undoubtedly “scientific communities,” and
they may be equally well credentialed. But the state of
general acceptance would be quite different depending on
how narrowly or broadly the “relevant scientific
community” is defined.
We might call this “the problem of breadth.” How
broadly should the “relevant scientific community” be
defined? In the above example, is the “relevant scientific
community” for claims about gravity waves, gravity-wave
physicists, experimental physicists, all physicists, or even
all scientists? Conceptually, the problem of breadth is a
difficult problem. Narrow definitions of community have the
virtue of capturing a community in which most members
will have a high degree of familiarity with and knowledge
about the claim in question. But such communities will also
have the vice of consisting of members who are more likely
to have an entrenched or vested interest, whether financial
or emotional, in the claims in question. Likewise, a broad
community will have the virtue of a community of
individuals with little vested interest in the problem. But
such a community may not have the depth of familiarity as
the narrower community.
The courts, however, have not found the problem of
breadth all that conceptually difficult. Instead, virtually all
courts have articulated a preference construing the
“relevant scientific community” broadly, rather than
narrowly. The courts’ rationale appears to be implicitly
based on the idea, commonly espoused by sociologists and
philosophers of science, that unfettered criticism is
necessary to produce robust knowledge.113 The courts
111

. Brewer, supra note 6, at 1633.
. H. M. Collins, Certainty and the Public Understanding of Science:
Science on Television, 17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 689, 692 (1987).
113
. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: TOWARD THE
112
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appear to recognize that breadth is necessary to generate
what the Florida Supreme Court described as “the kind of
searching, critical review that is the sine qua non of
scientific acceptance.”114 For example, California’s case
adopting the Frye rule, People v. Kelly, noted, “[i]deally,
resolution of the general acceptance issue would require
consideration of the views of a typical cross-section of the
scientific community, including representatives, if there are
such, of those who oppose or question the new
technique.”115
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in a
similar fashion, asserted that the “relevant scientific
community must be defined broadly enough to include a
sufficiently broad sample of scientists so that the possibility
of disagreement exists.”116 The court cautioned trial judges
not to “define the ‘relevant scientific community’ so
narrowly that the expert’s opinion will inevitably be
considered generally accepted.”117 In People v. Watson, the
Appellate Court of Illinois agreed with the trial court opinion
“that too narrow a definition of the pertinent scientific
community would render the Frye standard meaningless
and ineffective.”118 The Appellate Court added, “[w]e have
found overwhelming support for this view in the decisions
of other courts which have confronted this issue.”119 In
CODIFICATION OF THEORY AND RESEARCH (1949); KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS
29 (1965).
114
. Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2001).
115
. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1976).
116
. Canavan’s Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 n.6 (Mass. 2000); see
also Bernardoni v. Industrial Com’n, 840 N.E.2d 300, 311 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (“A court must not define the relevant field of experts so narrowly
that the expert’s opinion inevitably will be considered generally accepted.
If the community is defined to include only those experts who subscribe
to the same beliefs as the testifying expert, the opinion always will be
admissible. The community of experts must include a sufficiently broad
sample of experts so that the possibility of disagreement exists.”).
117
. Canavan’s Case, 733 N.E.2d at 1050 n.6.
118
. People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
119
. Id. (citing State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993); People v.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Pizarro, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884
(Colo. 1993); Lipscomb, 574 N.E.2d 1345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d 311 (1992); State
v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483 (N.H. 1992); People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d
990 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1992); United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio
1991)).
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United States v. Porter, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals deemed “somewhat astonishing” the government’s
proposal that the trial judge “severely restrict the
categories of scientists whose views he should consider in
assessing general acceptance.”120 The court voiced
agreement with the trial judge’s conclusion that “[i]t simply
is not creditable to argue . . . that general acceptance may
be premised simply on the opinion of forensic scientists.”121
Perhaps most significant is the absence of any opinions
in which courts take the opposite view—that the “relevant
scientific community” should be narrowly defined. There
are two major categories of exceptions to the trend toward
broad construal of the Frye test: voice spectrography and
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).122 In both categories, there are
numerous cases in which courts have upheld the
admissibility of evidence by narrowly construing the
“relevant scientific community.” In the DNA cases, the
government typically urged courts to define the “relevant
scientific community” as those who practice the technique
in a forensic context; whereas defendants typically argued
that the “relevant scientific community” should include
scientists who used DNA profiling techniques in academic
research. The government generally would argue that the
“relevant scientific community” consisted of those
individuals who performed actual forensic work, whereas
defendants would argue that researchers who used DNA
profiling techniques in their line of work were well equipped
to evaluate the use of the same techniques in forensics.
Both expert communities were scientists, but one derived
its authority from its experience in the trenches doing
forensic work, whereas the other derived its authority from
more traditional markers of academic prestige. In addition,
issues arose in forensic applications, for which academic
research provided no relevant experience. For example, the
120

. United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 634 (D.C. 1992).
. Id.
122
. An oft-cited “exception” to the principle of breadth, People v.
Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1958), is
not really an exception. In Williams, the broader community was simply
ignorant of the test under consideration. That differs from the case of
latent print individual-ization, in which members of the broader
community are aware of, and do not accept, the claim of the validity of
latent print individualization.
121
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issue of calculating the probative value of a DNA “match”
was one that arose in the forensic context, but not in the
academic research context; academic experts would first
need to educate themselves in order to comment on
forensic applications of the technique. The crucial issue was
whether the court circumscribed the “relevant scientific
community” narrowly, as those who practice forensic DNA
profiling, or more broadly, as those who generally practice
DNA profiling techniques. This decision ultimately
determined the outcome of the Frye inquiry.123
In voice spectrography cases, Professors Faigman et al.
have shown that the scope of the “relevant scientific
community” determined the outcome of Frye rulings; all
courts that construed Frye broadly and used no other test
excluded the evidence, while all courts that construed it
narrowly admitted it.124 However, although the courts
construed the “relevant scientific community” narrowly in
some cases, in none of them did the court defend
narrowness as a principle.125 This stands in marked contrast
to the voice spectrography cases in which the “relevant
scientific community” was construed broadly. In these
cases, the courts were able to eloquently articulate the
virtues of breadth.126 The conclusion perhaps is that
narrowness conveys virtues of outcome, but not of
principle.
Legal scholars also support the principle of breadth.
One legal commentator has recommended, “[w]here only
proponents of a technique appear, the court should sua
123

. See generally Saul Halfon, Collecting, Testing and Convincing:
Forensic DNA Experts in the Courts, 28 SOC. STUD. SCI. 801 (1998);
Schwartz, supra note 33. Interestingly, in the earliest cases, it was the
government that construed the relevant scientific community broadly,
bringing in high-powered academic scientists like Kenneth Kidd of Yale
University and Richard Roberts. Only when criminal defendants began
recruiting equally high-powered scientists from the academic community,
like Richard Lewontin of Harvard University and Eric Lander of MIT, did the
government seek to narrow the definition of the community. See JAY D.
ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA
PROFILING (2007).
124
.
125
. See Hodo v. Superior Court, Riverside County, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973); United States v. Maivia, 728 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Haw.
1990); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1975); People v.
Bein, 453 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
126
. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978).
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sponte take the responsibility of inquiring not just whether
the experts believe the scientific community is generally in
agreement, but whether they are in fact aware of any
opposing sentiment in the relevant scientific community.”127

B. MEASURING “GENERAL ACCEPTANCE”
Even if the “relevant scientific community” is defined, a
second major ambiguity in the Frye rule remains. How
should “general acceptance” be measured within that
community? Must there be unanimous acceptance within
the “relevant scientific community”? Will a simple majority
do, or should some sort of supermajority be required?
Should all voices be weighted equally, or should some sort
of differential weighting be applied? If the latter, how
should weight be accorded? By academic prestige? By
familiarity with the specific question at hand? Or, should
the opposite principle hold? Perhaps the greater the
individual’s professional distance from the question at
hand, the greater weight their opinion should be afforded,
on the reasoning that they have the least interest in the
outcome of the Frye analysis.
Although these are thorny questions, courts have not
had that much difficulty working out some general practical
parameters. For example, numerous courts have taken the
trouble to refute the red herring that general acceptance is
understood as unanimous acceptance in the “relevant
scientific community.”128 But how much general acceptance
is required and how it should be measured remain open
questions. Some courts criticize what they call “nose
counting” or “head counting,” a sort of crude counting of
implicitly expressed “votes” in the “relevant scientific
127

. Comment, The Voiceprint Dilemma: Should Voices be Seen and
not Heard?, 35 MD. L. REV. 267, 293 (1975); see also James P. Flannery,
Kara Howe, & Blanca Dominguez, Frye, Daubert, Donaldson, and Junk
Science: The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence in Illinois, CBA REC.,
May 2004, at 30, 37 (stating that “narrowing the pertinent field too much
would render the Frye test meaningless and ineffective”).
128
. See, e.g., Kaelbel Wholesale, Inc. v. Soderstrom, 785 So. 2d 539,
546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re K.T., 836 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005); In re Commitment of Bushong, 815 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004);
People v. Dalcollo, 669 N.E.2d 378, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Clemons v.
State, 896 A.2d 1059 (Md. 2006); Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 657
P.2d 594 (Mont. 1983); State v. Whittey, 821 A.2d 1086 (N.H. 2003).
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community.”129 For some courts, nose counting is
problematic because it entails weighing all opinions equally,
rather than affording greater weight to the more
qualified.130 Others argue that waiting for a sufficient “nose
count” will delay acceptance of cutting edge science.131
Some courts have criticized “nose counting” in the process
of arguing that a forgiving relevancy test is preferable to
the Frye test.132 Others have criticized it in the process of
arguing
for
their
own
idiosyncratic
admissibility
standards.133 Still other have criticized “nose counting” in
the process of calling for a Daubert-like reliability inquiry to
replace the Frye test.134
Still, some courts and scholars have defended “nose
counting.”135 Of all the arguments against “nose counting”
surveyed above, only the first does not entail the rejection
of Frye itself. Therefore, to a court that does subscribe to
Frye, the only relevant criticism is the first: the Leahy
court’s caution that not all votes should necessarily be
counted equally. This would require some sort of weighting
solution. The Leahy court argues that weighing should be
operationalized by insisting that the court “must consider
the quality, as well as quantity, of the evidence supporting
or opposing a new scientific technique.”136 This notion of
“quality” appears to be something akin to scientific
credentials or even prestige. In Leahy it was used to require
129

. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 336–37 (Cal. 1994); People v. Marlow,
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Kaelbel Wholesale, Inc., 785
So.2d at 546; Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 1997).
130
. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 336–37; Marlow, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31; Kaelbel
Wholesale, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 546; Brim, 695 So. 2d at 272.
131
. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 201 (N.M. 1993).
132
. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1988); Taylor v.
State, 889 P.2d 319 (Okl. Cr. 1995); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435
(Wyo. 1993); State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ohio 1983). In the
case of Andrews, the call for a “relevancy” test would appear to be
overruled by Florida Supreme Court cases endorsing the Frye test.
133
. Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ga. 1982).
134
. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
135
. Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 42 (D.C. 1988) (affirming “the
focus is primarily on counting scientists’ votes, rather than on verifying
the soundness of a scientific conclusion,”); , at 222 (“Instead of evaluating
various scientists’ opinions, a court is only to count numbers of scientists
within a relevant community who do or do not accept a theory or
technique.”)
136
. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 336–37 (Cal. 1994).
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more than the testimony of police practitioners to deem the
test at issue to be valid.137 This is not really a criticism of
nose counting, but merely a honing of it. Indeed, it is hard
to escape the conclusion that Frye necessarily requires
some sort of polling of the scientific community if any sort
of general acceptance is to be ascertained. In any case,
none of these concerns will pose any difficulty for a general
acceptance analysis of latent print individualization since
both crude nose counting and weighted prestige counts will
yield the same result.

III. ANALYSIS OF LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE
UNDER FRYE
It is established that for most Frye-subscribing courts,
the “relevant scientific community” should be construed
broadly and should not consist solely of practitioners, if at
all. It is also established that Frye necessarily entails some
sort of polling of the views of that “relevant scientific
community”—call it nose counting if you wish. How do
these principles apply to latent print evidence? The first
question is: Who constitutes the “relevant scientific
community” for the claim of latent print individualization?
A. CONSTITUTING

THE

“RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY”

Historically, it has been assumed that latent print
examiners constitute the “relevant scientific community,”
and latent print individualization enjoys high, perhaps even
unanimous, “acceptance” in this community. However, as
discussed above, for other forms of evidence, courts have
generally held inadmissible types of evidence accepted only
among practitioners of the technique. Admittedly, latent
print practitioners are more numerous than polygraphers or
voice spectrographers. However, as one court stated, “Mere
numerical majority support or opposition by persons
minimally qualified to state an authoritative opinion is of
little value.”138
1
138
1
137

. Id.
. Id.; see also People v. Marlow, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 31 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (“[T]he trial court (and the appellate court on de novo review) must
not simply count heads but must look to the quality as well as the
quantity of evidence supporting or opposing a new scientific method.”).
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1. Why Latent Print Practitioners Cannot Constitute the
“Relevant Scientific Community”

How can latent print examiners be viewed as
“minimally qualified to state an authoritative opinion”139 on
the validity of latent print individualization? This statement
may seem counterintuitive to some, but it can be easily
understood by considering the difference between
practicing a technique and assessing the validity of that
technique. The question before the court in a Frye
proceeding is whether the “proposition” has passed from
the “experimental” to the “demonstrable stage.”140 In other
words: has the correctness of the proposition been
demonstrated? Knowing whether latent print examiners can
in fact do what they claim to be able to do requires
performing what is generally called a “validation study.” A
validation study measures the rate at which latent print
examiners achieve accurate results.141 Validation is a
common process in the sciences by which the ability of a
test or assay to achieve accurate results is measured.
Scientists in a wide variety of disciplines are trained to
assess whether instruments of various types are valid. It is
important to note that practicing a technique does not
constitute validating it. Indeed, one can practice a
technique without even being aware of whether or not it is
valid. Moreover, no amount of day-to-day practice can
inform the practitioner of the validity of the technique. A
practitioner cannot “experience” validity. Validity must be
measured, usually through a study.
Latent print examiners, however, normally undergo no
such training. Latent print examiners are trained to analyze
latent prints. They are not trained to conduct validation
studies, or to perform literature reviews in order to assess
whether validation studies have been conducted. Most
latent print examiners have little scientific education and
cannot reasonably be expected to understand validation,
conduct such a study, or to assess the quality of a
139

. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 337.
. Id. at 340.
141
. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Appropriate
Validation” in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in
Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, not the Narrow Scientific
Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 759–60 (2003).
140
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purported validation study. To be sure, this situation is
changing with the entry of more young trainees with
scientific training into the profession, and there are a few
latent print examiners who are very familiar with validation
studies.142 Nevertheless, even these exceptions do not
make the community a good arbiter of whether latent print
individualization has been validated. Because their business
is analyzing prints and not conducting or assessing
validation studies, the fact that thousands of latent print
examiners accept latent print individualization is of little
value.143 Evidence scholars suggest that individuals
indifferent to validation cannot properly constitute the
“relevant scientific community”—”The emphasis should be
on scientists . . . If the general acceptance standard is to
fulfill its objectives, the theory and technology that
generate the evidence must be familiar to a community of
experts who rarely embrace methods that have not been
rigorously validated.”144
Professor Jonakait’s characterization of electrophoresis,
a more technical form of forensic evidence, is equally, if not
more applicable to latent print evidence:
A forensic procedure becomes widespread not because all the
people using it have made independent evaluations about
reliability. . . . If the new technique appears to work, then the
methods are taught to others. Since few labs can afford to employ
only highly trained scientists, often those learning the procedures
are not scientists, but technicians. Thus, most of those who use
the new tests have not verified the test’s reliability, and few
would have the training to conduct such research in any event.
The users of the procedure, then, trust that the procedure is
reliable, not because they have verified that fact but because the
developers of the procedure say that it is reliable. Widespread use
of electrophoretic tests in forensic labs thus does not indicate
anything more about reliability than that a handful of people have
1

142

. Such as Glenn Langenburg of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension, who has a degree in chemistry and experience in the
chemical industry including validation studies. See Trial Transcript, State
v. Columbus, No. 04082599 (Minn. Hennepin County Dist. Ct. May 18,
2006) (on file with the author).
1
143
. See (“[A] technician’s testimony should never suffice to establish
the validity of a novel technique.”). There is no logical reason that
Professor Giannelli’s statement should be limited to “novel” techniques,
and he may have only used it because of the Frye’s novelty requirement.
On the novelty requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 255–268.
1
144
.
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489

In fact, latent print practitioners would be the subjects
of properly conducted validation studies of the latent print
individualization. It is their accuracy that would be
measured. Allowing latent print examiners to constitute the
“relevant scientific community” would be to confuse the
confidence of a practitioner in the validity of her own
practice with validity as assessed by an outside observer.
Latent print examiners’ confidence in the validity of their
own practice is not meaningful because latent print
examiners do not receive valid feedback in going about the
course of their work. They are not regularly told whether
they have reached correct results for the simple reason that
in casework the correct results are not known to anyone. At
best, a latent print examiner might sometimes receive
feedback from a peer who disagrees with their conclusion.
But if, for example, an error were corroborated rather than
detected by the peer, neither individual would necessarily
receive valid feedback about the error.146 Because of this
lack of valid feedback, the examiners are in no position to
assess the accuracy of their own practice. Indeed, if asked
to assess accuracy, they are very likely to confuse their
own confidence with actual validity. Much the same point
has been made about polygraph examiners: “[P]olygraph
examiners are perhaps the group whose opinions
concerning the technique are, paradoxically, of the least
value.”147 If relevant scientific communities were construed
merely as practitioners, then astrologers would constitute
the “relevant scientific community” that “accepts”
astrology as valid and wine tasters would constitute the
“relevant scientific community” for assessing the ability of
wine tasters to accurately identify vintages and types of
wine.
It is clear then, that if the question is the validity of the
1

145

. Randolph Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal
Cases, 31 EMORY L. J. 833, 860–61 (1982).
1
146
. For examples of actual cases in which errors were corroborated,
rather than detected, see Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for
Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985,
1023-1025 (2005).
1
147
. William G. Iacono & David Lykken, The Scientific Status of
Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in
SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 609, 618 (Faigman et al. eds., 2002).
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technique, the proper scientific community is those
equipped to assess validity, not those equipped to practice
the technique. Indeed, as several courts have noted, the
very purpose of the Frye rule is to “ensure[] that the
persons most qualified to assess scientific validity of a
technique
have
the
determinative
voice.”148
The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court aptly described the virtue of
Frye in the following manner: it “require[es] judges to pay
deference to the conclusions of those who are in the best
position to evaluate the merits of scientific theory and
technique when ruling on the admissibility of scientific
proof . . . .”149 This, the court argues, “is the better way of
insuring that only reliable expert scientific evidence is
admitted at trial.”150
In addition, courts have expressed concern about
practitioners’ interests, financial and institutional, and these
concerns apply with force to latent print examiners. If latent
print individualization evidence were not generally
accepted, it would no longer be admissible in court. Most
latent print examiners would probably be out of a job. But
latent print examiners’ emotional investment is probably
even greater than their pecuniary interest. The
extraordinary claims of “infallibility”151 or “total reliability”152
that today still surrounds latent print individualization, as
distinct from all other areas of forensic science, make the
idea that the technique lacks validation particularly difficult
for practitioners to accept. To accept scientists’ arguments
that latent print individualization lacks validation may imply
that latent print examiners had been perpetrating a fraud,
or at least an exaggeration. It is not unreasonable to think
that a latent print examiner who had devoted her career to
this practice would have great difficulty taking such a step.
This difficulty may be demonstrated by the rather visceral
148

. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000); Grady v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 789 A.2d 735, 743 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (overturned on
other grounds).
149
. Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d at 1045.
150
. Id.
151
. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS: CLASSIFICATION AND
USES, at iv (1985).
152
. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis Study and
Technology,
Press
Kit,
May
18,
2004,
http://www.swgfast.org/swgfast_press_ kit_may04.html.
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reaction in the latent print community to scientists’
argument that the technique lacks validation.153
The California Supreme Court wrote that to establish
reliability and general acceptance, “[t]he witness must
have academic and professional credentials which equip
him to understand both the scientific principles involved
and any differences of view on their reliability. He must also
be ‘impartial,’ that is, not so personally invested in
establishing the technique’s acceptance that he might not
be objective about disagreements within the relevant
scientific community.”154 Latent print examiners violate
both criteria; they fail to understand the scientific principles
that have led to differences of view about the reliability of
latent print individualization. This is evidenced by their
consistent mustering of irrelevant arguments concerning
the uniqueness of friction ridge skin, or the use of latent
prints in casework in response to questions about the
reliability of latent print individualization.155 And, as already
noted, they are not impartial.

B. MEASURING “GENERAL ACCEPTANCE”
How is a court to assess the views of the “relevant
scientific community” once it determines who makes up
that community? One tempting possibility would be to
somehow survey that community.156 There is actually some
precedent for such an approach. Several surveys have been
conducted explicitly for the purpose of assessing the
general acceptance of the polygraph and social framework
testimony about eyewitness identification.157 Is there such a
153

. See, e.g., ANDRÉ MOENSSENS, THE RELIABILITY OF FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION: A
CASE
REPORT
(2002),
available
at
http://www.forensicevidence.com/site/ID/pollak2002.html; David L. Grieve, Rocking the
Cradle, 49 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 719 (1999).
154
. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 530 (Cal. 1985).
155
. See Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 35.
156
.
157
. Not surprisingly, proponents and opponents of polygraphy were
able to archive diametrically opposed results in their surveys based on
the way in which they constructed the relevant scientific community.
ALDER, supra note 70, at 256; ; Saul M. Kassin et al., The “General
Acceptance” of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony, 44 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1089, 1096 (1989) (arguing that “for assessing the consensus
of opinion on various eyewitness findings” the survey method “is the only
plausible method and is far better than other means of establishing
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survey assessing the state of general acceptance of latent
print individualization?

1. Formal Surveys
As it turns out, one such survey has been conducted for
latent print individualization.158 The survey was conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in preparation
for the first Daubert challenge to latent print evidence in
1999.159 The cover letter makes clear that the survey was
meant, at least in part, to address the general acceptance
prong of Daubert.160 The survey did not directly ask whether
the
respondents
generally
accept
latent
print
individualization, but it did ask, in Question #A7, “Does
your agency accept the fundamental principles of
uniqueness and permanence as scientific basis [sic] for
using fingerprints as a means of individualization?”161 All
respondents who completed this part of the survey (fortynine respondents) responded “yes” to this survey item.162
The survey was presented as evidence of general
acceptance in the Mitchell Daubert hearing.163 The survey
question should be interpreted as acceptance of the
premises that make latent print individualization plausible
but instead has been confused with acceptance that latent
print individualization actually works. However, even if we
construe the question as asking about general acceptance
of the validity of latent print individualization, rather than to
its premises, should the fact that one hundred percent of
respondents answered “yes” to that question indicate
general acceptance in the “relevant scientific community”?
The answer is probably not. In addition to the problem
of indirectly focusing on acceptance of premises rather than
on the process itself, the survey suffers from
methodological flaws. For example, the survey might be
general acceptance”). Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance”
of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 405 (2001).
158
. FBI LABORATORY, SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY’S [sic] FINGERPRINT
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A DAUBERT HEARING (1999).
159
. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2004).
160
. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
161
. FBI LABORATORY, supra note 158.
162
. Id.
163
. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 241.
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biased because it included a cover letter that began as
follows:
The FBI needs your immediate help! The FBI Laboratory is
preparing for a Daubert Hearing [sic] on the scientific basis for
fingerprints as a means of identification. The Laboratory’s
Forensic Analysis Section, Latent Print Unit, is coordinating this
matter and supporting the Assistant United States Attorney in
collecting data needed to establish this scientific basis and its
universal acceptance. The overall strategy must specifically
address the two fundamental principles (uniqueness and
permanence) for using fingerprints to individualize. The
availability of the requested information will not only provide
supportive documentation but will also fulfill one of the other
Daubert elements, i.e., that the scientific basis is widely
accepted.164

The letter went on:
The time sensitive nature of these requests cannot be expressed
strongly enough, nor can the importance of your cooperation. The
potential impact of the Federal court not being convinced of the
scientific basis for fingerprints providing individuality has farreaching and potentially negative ramifications to everyone in law
enforcement. The FBI wishes to present the strongest data
available in an effort to insure success in this legal matter and
your cooperation is a key component in achieving this success.165

This stimulus does not appear to be consistent with the
fundamental principles of survey research. The letter
makes the purpose of the study clear, the desired response
clear, and threatens dire social consequences (“potentially
negative ramifications”) if the desired response is not
provided. The letter purports that these consequences not
only threaten the respondents, but innocent bystanders as
well—”everyone in law enforcement”—should every
respondent not give the desired response.166 A further
biasing effect may have been exerted by the fact that, on
the crucial Question #7, respondents were asked to provide
“an explanation as an attachment” if they answered “no,”
but not if they answered “yes.” This asymmetry creates a
disincentive to answer “no.” These methodological
164

. FBI LABORATORY, supra note 158.
. Id.
166
. DON A. DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD 161
(2nd ed. 2007) (stating that it is inappropriate to give an “obviously
biased” explanation of why the survey is being conducted that gives “the
impression that the sponsor wants responses from people who have
opinions that are highly supportive” of one particular position in a survey
cover letter).
165
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problems make the mutual accusations of methodological
flaws in the polygraph surveys look like nitpicking.167
But even these problems pale in comparison to the
issue of the selection of respondents. The survey was sent
to the fingerprint units of fifty-three law enforcement
agencies (the fifty state police agencies, plus the police
agencies of the District of Columbia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom).168 As a method of polling the “relevant
scientific community,” the selection of recipients clearly
leaves something to be desired. The pool of recipients is
limited to latent print examiners. As discussed supra,
limiting the “relevant scientific community” to practitioners
allows a practitioner group to “self-validate” and, as the
Court noted in Kumho Tire, would fail to bar even astrology
or necromancy from meeting the general acceptance
test.169 It is noteworthy that in the case of surveys designed
to measure the state of general acceptance of the
polygraph, even though various scientists waged a
strenuous battle about how the respondent pool should be
delineated, neither side advocated that the respondent pool
be limited to practitioners (that is, polygraph operators) and
exclude scientists.170 The selection problem in the FBI
survey makes the mutual accusations of selection bias in
the polygraph debate look minimal. Similarly, the designers
of the social framework testimony surveys worried about
the breadth of their sample even though they did not limit
their sample to “practitioners” (that is, those who give
social framework expert testimony in court).171
Limiting the recipient pool to practitioners would be bad
enough, but the FBI further limited the pool to current
employees of law enforcement agencies. Although most
practicing latent print examiners, no matter where they are
employed, probably “accept” latent print individualization,
those who might have doubts are more likely to express
those doubts when they are no longer employed in law
enforcement.172 The cover letter’s insinuation that a
167
168
169
170
171
172

.
.
.
.
.
.

See supra note 157.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 223.
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
See sources cited supra note 157.
Kassin, et al., supra note 157, at 414.
This point is anecdotally illustrated by the example of Mark Acree,
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negative response to the “acceptance” question would
have “far-reaching and potentially negative ramifications to
everyone in law enforcement”—that is, all the survey
respondents’ employers and colleagues—only further
undermines the trustworthiness of a survey of current of
law enforcement employees.
Not surprisingly, given these methodological flaws, the
survey has never been published or submitted to formal
peer review. Again, the contrast with the polygraph surveys
is telling. The polygraph surveys (criticized for lack of
scientific peer review173) came closer to proper scientific
publication than the FBI survey, because the polygraph
surveys were, respectively, published in a non-refereed
journal and submitted as a successful master’s thesis in
psychology.174
One would think that courts would be concerned by so
poor a survey that so clearly seeks to limit the relevant
community to practitioners. But, to the contrary, courts
have accepted this survey without any qualms. In Mitchell,
the case in which the survey was first introduced, the Third
Circuit ruled that latent print individualization clearly met
the general acceptance prong of Daubert because of “the
results of the FBI’s survey of state agencies.”175 In response
to Mitchell’s argument that law enforcement latent print
examiners did not constitute the “relevant scientific
community,” the court drew on Kumho Tire to argue that
“the scientific/nonscientific distinction is irrelevant.”176 But
Kumho Tire renders the scientific/ nonscientific distinction
irrelevant for purposes of applying Daubert. That is, Kumho
applied Daubert to all expert evidence. There is nothing in
Kumho Tire that justifies the exclusion of scientists from the
general acceptance analysis. Moreover, even if Kumho
renders the scientific/nonscientific distinction irrelevant, the
problems with the FBI’s constitution of the “relevant
scientific community” are greater than the mere fact that
who identified latent prints for the FBI. Upon leaving the FBI, he has now
publicly expressed his doubts concerning the validity of latent print
individualization. See infra notes 269–276 and accompanying text.
173
.
174
.
175
. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004).
176
. Id.
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law enforcement latent print examiners are not scientists.
There are also the problems that the FBI’s “community” is
composed too narrowly and entirely of interested parties.
The FBI survey also carried great weight with the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth
v. Patterson.177 The court found, “[t]his survey is a sufficient
basis on which the judge could have concluded there to be
general acceptance of the theory in the fingerprint
examiner community.”178 Interestingly, the court made this
finding in a decision that found inadmissible a special
application of latent print individualization called
simultaneous
impressions.
The
court
found
that
simultaneous impressions lacked general acceptance in
part because of the absence of a survey like the FBI’s.
Although an FBI Latent Print Unit Chief testified that
simultaneous impressions were “generally accepted in the
community of qualified fingerprint examiners,” the court
noted that, “[u]nlike his testimony in the single impression
context, however, Agent [sic] Meagher’s testimony is
conclusory and unsupported by any evidence, let alone an
extensive multi-jurisdictional survey.”179
Although the court was correct to find that
simultaneous impressions lack general acceptance, the
opinion, by describing the FBI’s fifty-three-respondent,
177

. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 24 (Mass. 2005).
. Id.
179
. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
But see Steve Ostrowski,
Simultaneous Impressions: Revisiting the Controversy, WEEKLY DETAIL, Nov.
5, 2001, http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/1-99/TheDetail13.htm.
Interestingly, a survey concerning the general acceptance of
simultaneous impressions did exist at the time of Patterson, but the
government inexplicably failed to enter it into evidence. The Patterson
court noted that it would have found the survey unconvincing even if it
were introduced into evidence because the sample was smaller than that
of the FBI study (n=18, versus n=49) and it found only moderate
acceptance of simultaneous impressions (ten out of eighteen
respondents).
At the time of Ostrowski’s (non-peer reviewed) survey, no empirical
studies measuring the ability of latent print examiners to identify
correctly simultaneous impressions existed. (One study has since been
published. See John P. Black, Pilot Study: The Application of ACE-V to
Simultaneous (Cluster) Impressions, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 933 (2006).
Given that, even under these circumstances, more than half (10/18) of
latent print examiners were willing to “accept” simultaneous impressions
illustrates the hazards of allowing practitioners, rather than scientists, to
constitute the relevant scientific community.
178
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methodologically flawed, poorly worded survey of a highly
biased sample in glowing terms (“an extensive multijurisdictional survey”), sets an extremely low bar for
survey-based
evidence
of
general
acceptance.180
Essentially, the opinion invites the government to satisfy
the admissibility threshold for simultaneous impressions by
conducting a survey of fifty some-odd law enforcement
agents. Such an interpretation of the Frye rule would allow
the government to claim general acceptance of any
testimonial claim simply by conducting a survey of state
law enforcement laboratories. This is a far cry from the
original Frye case in which the court insisted that Marston
win acceptance from his psychologist colleagues as a
requirement of admissibility.

2. What is the “Relevant Scientific Community” for Latent
Print Individualization?
If the existing survey is not satisfactory, how can we
measure the state of general acceptance of latent print
individualization? The problem is unusually vexing because
latent print examiners appear to be a non-scientist
practitioner community. Therefore, the nature of the nonpractitioner “relevant scientific community” is not obvious.
If a court operating under a deference model wants to avoid
allowing a practitioner community to self-validate, where
can it turn in an inquiry into general acceptance? The case
of latent print evidence would seem to pose a new sort of
problem, one which has not been addressed existing
discussions about expert evidence. Legal scholars are
accustomed to thinking about cases in which the contested
claim has a relatively obvious appropriate reference
community.181 For example, in the Frye case itself, Marston
was a Harvard-trained psychologist.182 His claims to be able
to discern whether his device accurately detected
deception were rooted in his training as a psychologist. It
therefore seemed appropriate for the Frye court to treat
180

. See
. I am grateful to Professor Risinger, coiner of neologisms
extraordinaire, for his inspiration in coining this term.
182
. Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes Neuroscience-based Lie Detection:
The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 385–86 (2007).
See also ALDER, supra note 70.
181
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psychologists and physiologists as the “relevant scientific
community” whose “acceptance” was required for
Marston’s technique to be admissible. This formulation of
the problem has persisted with regard to the lie detector
ever since. Although adversaries over the admissibility of lie
detectors vigorously debate how the opinions of
psychologists of various qualifications should be weighed—
with opponents of the lie detector emphasizing academic
credentials and proponents emphasizing operational
familiarity with lie detection techniques—neither side has
seriously disputed the identification of psychologists in
general as the relevant (or at least the primary) scientific
community.
Other Frye inquiries have similarly managed to identify
relevant scientific communities without undue difficulty. For
example, courts have looked to audiologists, acousticians,
speech scientists, acoustical engineers, anatomists,
electrical engineers, linguists, phoneticists, physicists,
physiologists, psychologists, and statisticians to constitute
the
“relevant
scientific
community”
for
voice
spectrography.183 Of course in such cases, the parties, not
surprisingly, may differ as to which academic specialty is
most relevant. But these are differences between scientific
specialties, what Professor Brewer would call “extracompetition of credentialed experts.”184
A Frye analysis of latent print individualization poses a
different issue altogether. The court is faced, not with a
choice among scientific communities, but with the absence
of any obviously “relevant scientific community” at all. The
logic of the deference model is that the “relevant scientific
community” is the group of people of whom the claimant
must convince in order for the court to find her claims
credible. The court does not exercise its own judgment as
to the plausibility of the claim, but rather, seeks to
determine whether the claimant has managed to convince
the right people. Since Marston was a psychologist, the
right people in his case were primarily psychologists. To be
sure, Marston might have sought to convince the court that
some other group ought to be considered the “relevant
scientific community” for his claim, but he would probably
183
184

. FAIGMAN, FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES, supra note 80, at 296 n.4.
. Brewer, supra note 6, at 1633.
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not have been successful. This is because, first, his training
was in psychology—there is a logic to requiring the
claimant to convince the members of the discipline in which
he was trained—and second, because the detection of
deception is a scientific problem that would seem to fall
within the domain of psychology.
Adopting this reasoning, it is by no means clear whom
latent print examiners needed to convince. As Professors
Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin note, “[w]ith procedures that
have no application outside the courtroom . . . defining the
relevant scientific field is a major obstacle to an evenhanded and predictable application of the general
acceptance standard.”185 What the appropriate reference
community should be for latent print examiners’ claim to be
able to individualize latent prints is not a trivial problem.
Unlike Marston and other early polygraphers, latent print
examiners do not emanate from an academic discipline to
which a court could refer to see whether the claim has been
“generally accepted,” nor is it immediately apparent into
which scientific discipline’s domain latent print examiners’
claim should fall. Plausible claims might be made for
psychology, computer science, quality engineering, biology,
and statistics. At this point in history, no discipline has won
“jurisdiction” over the problem.186 What, then, is a court to
do? I suggest that the court has little choice but to look to
the scholarly community as a whole and constitute an ad
hoc, interdisciplinary appropriate reference community
composed of those individuals who have made a reasonably
informed effort to assess the issue of the validity of latent
print examiners’ claim to be able to individualize from
latent prints. The court might call these scholars metaexperts, experts able to evaluate the expert knowledge
claims of other experts.187 It would appear then that a court
185

.
. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT
LABOR (1988).
187
. The term “meta-expert” is also used by Professor Brewer, supra
note 6, at 1627. However, Professor Brewer posits a different sort of
meta-expert to solve a less difficult problem. Professor Brewer’s metaexperts help a judge choose among competing experts “in a given area.”
My meta-experts are deployed to solve a more difficult situation in which
non-scientist expert practitioners (who give testimony that purports to be
scientific) make claims that require evaluation by experts. My notion of
the meta-expert is also inspired in part by Professors Collins and Evans’s
186
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undertaking a Frye inquiry would need to look not to a
specific scientific discipline, such as psychology, but to the
scientific community at large. It will be noted, of course,
that most members of the scientific community at large do
not analyze latent prints, and some readers may wonder
how non-practitioners can evaluate the knowledge claims of
practitioners. It is crucial to recognized that meta-experts
are not evaluating latent print examiners’ analyses of
particular latent prints; they are evaluating the question of
whether latent print individualization has been validated.
This requires, not an evaluation of latent prints, but an
evaluation of a study of the performance of latent print
examiners on the task of attributing latent prints.188
Similarly, in the Frye case itself, the court called on the
“relevant scientific community” to evaluate whether
proponents of the lie detector has amassed sufficient
evidence to convince them that the device correctly
detected deception. This evaluation did not require that the
members of the “relevant scientific community” be capable
of operating the device themselves. Their perceived
competence lay in their ability to design and interpret
comment that my own native discipline of Science & Technology Studies
constitutes “expertise about expertise.” H.M. Collins & Robert Evans, The
Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, 32
SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 235, 239 (2002).
Nonetheless. the notion of the meta-expert that I positing here does
not require individuals with claims to “expertise about expertise,” such as
sociologists or philosophers of science. Instead, I am suggesting that any
scholar who makes a reasonably informed evaluation of the empirical
issue at hand would qualify as a “meta-expert.”
In later work, Collins and Evans describe multiple “meta-expertises.”
HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE 45 (2007). Most of the metaexpertises they describe have little to do with what I am describing here
because they primarily involve using social knowledge to make judgments
about claims to expertise. Their notion of “downward discrimination,” of
which “peer review” is the best known variant, comes closest to what I
am trying to capture here.
188
. In the case of latent print individualization, the situation is further
complicated by the fact that the government has never put forward any
empirical study that it claims validates latent print individualization.
Haber & Haber, supra note 35. Rather than critiquing some purported
validation study, they are simply articulating the parameters of empirical
evidence that would be necessary to support a particular knowledge and
noting the absence of any such evidence. Since this amounts to proving a
negative, meta-experts are not able to “prove” the absence of such a
study. Instead, they can only assert that literature reviews have not
revealed any such study.
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empirical studies of performance of a particular task, rather
than the ability to perform the task being studied.

3. Polling the “Relevant Scientific Community”
A court undertaking a Frye inquiry in 1990 would have
found no clear evidence that latent print examiners had
convinced any non-practitioner scientist of the accuracy of
latent print individualization.189 Today however, the
situation has changed. A number of scientists and legal
scholars have evaluated the claims that latent print
individualization is valid. Therefore, a court using a
deference model can undertake to survey whether nonpractitioner scientists and scholars accept the validity of
latent print individualization. In what follows, this article
examines three potential sources of information on the
state of general acceptance of this claim in the broad
scientific community: expert witness testimony, amicus
curiae briefs, and published scholarly literature. All are wellrecognized ways of assessing the state of general
acceptance in a scientific community. In addition, all three
involve acts in which an individual symbolically stakes his
or her scientific or scholarly reputation on his or her
opinion. In all three cases, this article examines compiled
lists of “acceptors” and “non-acceptors.” In doing so, this
article by no means suggests that courts undertaking Frye
inquires need always be bound by such crude head counts
or that the rules for counting that it uses are the only ones
that could be used. I am by no means suggesting that all
matters of contested knowledge can be resolved by polling.
I am, however, suggesting that such polling may be a
necessary first step for a fact-finder undertaking a process
of “practical epistemic deference.” Polling results that
contradict the fact-finders intuitions ought not merely be
dismissed, but would seem to at least necessitate further
inquiry. Therefore, such head counts may be suggestive as
to the state of general acceptance. Moreover, there is some
precedent for such an approach. Litigants have in the past
1

189

. Although numerous scientists have written about latent print
identification, very few of them have said anything in writing about the
accuracy of latent print identification. The few exceptions have merely
asserted the accuracy of latent print identification, not supported the
claim with any empirical evidence. See infra notes 235-238 and
accompanying text.
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submitted such lists to courts charged with performing Frye
analyses.190

a. Expert Testimony
Courts have suggested a variety of methods for
measuring general acceptance. One is through the
testimony of expert witnesses.191 The first modern
admissibility challenge to latent print individualization was
held in United States v. Mitchell.192 Although the hearing in
Mitchell was governed by Daubert, not by Frye, the record
can be used to assess the state of general acceptance of
latent print individualization.
The government presented the testimony of seven
expert witnesses. Three of the government experts were
latent print examiners with no advanced scientific training,
although some had engaged in a significant amount of
scientific self-study.193 All three were questioned as to
whether “individualization, that is a positive identification,
can result from comparisons of friction ridge skin or
impressions containing sufficient quality (clarity) and
quantity of unique friction ridge detail.”194 All three
190

. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978).
. Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ga. 1982) (“An evaluation of
whether the principle has gained acceptance will often be transmitted to
the trial court by members of the appropriate scientific community
testifying as expert witnesses at trial.”); see also
192
. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
193
. In particular, see DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION
RIDGE ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY (1999). The other
two witnesses were Ed German, of the U.S. Army, and Stephen Meagher,
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
194
. Trial Transcript, July 8, 1999, at 37, United States v. Mitchell, 365
F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). The imprecise wording of this question is
unfortunate. First, asking whether positive identification “can” result
elides the fundamental issue of how often such conclusions of positive
identifications are correct. Because of the word “can,” the witnesses
presumably must answer “yes,” even if they believe the accuracy rate of
latent print individualization to be very low.
Indeed, even “nonacceptors” probably would have had to answer “yes” to this question.
Second, the qualifier “containing sufficient quality (clarity) and quantity of
unique friction ridge detail” presumably restricts the answer to a subset
of “comparisons” in which “sufficient” quality and quantity are present.
Since “sufficient” is not further specified, again, any witnesses would
have to answer “yes” even if the subset of comparisons that meet this
condition is extremely small.
191
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answered in the affirmative.195 This would seem to show
general acceptance of latent print individualization within
the practitioner community. A fourth latent print examiner,
who was called in rebuttal, had a Bachelor of Science
degree, but he was not asked whether he accepted
individualization.196
In addition, the government called three nonpractitioner witnesses with scientific credentials. William
Babler was a doctoral level anatomist.197 Babler appeared to
“accept” the premises given to him. However, Babler was
questioned about his acceptance of the “premises”
underlying latent print individualization, specifically the
uniqueness and permanence of friction ridge skin, rather
than about whether he accepted the validity of latent print
individualization itself.198 As noted above, the Frye inquiry
must be on the technique itself, not its premises. Donald
Ziesig, an engineer for Lockheed Martin, was questioned
about his role in conducting a study using the Lockheed
automated fingerprint matching system, not about the
validity of latent print individualization.199 Only one of the
scientists, Bruce Budowle, a doctoral level biologist, was
questioned
about
the
validity
of
latent
print
individualization. In response to essentially the same
question posed to the practitioners above, Budowle
answered in the affirmative.200 Thus, the government
showed that latent print individualization was “accepted”
by many non-scientist practitioners of the technique and by
one non-practitioner scientist.
The defendant presented the testimony of three expert
witnesses with scholarly credentials and varying degrees of
practitioner competence. David Stoney, a doctoral level
forensic scientist, was trained to analyze latent prints, but
195

. Trial Transcript, July 7, 1999, at 158–59, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215
(Mr. Ashbaugh); Trial Transcript, July 8, 1999, at 37, Mitchell, 365 F.3d
215 (Mr. German); Trial Transcript, July 9, 1999, at 186, Mitchell, 365 F.3d
215 (Mr. Meagher).
196
. Trial Transcript, July 13, 1999, at 53–60, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215
(Mr. Wertheim).
197
. Trial Transcript, July 7, 1999, at 7, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (Dr.
Babler).
198
. Trial Transcript, July 7, 1999, at 74, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215.
199
. See Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 223.
200
. Trial Transcript, July 9, 1999, at 141, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215.
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primarily made his living in other areas, particularly
microscopy.201 James Starrs was a Professor of both Law
and Forensic Science.202 The third defense expert was the
author of this article, who holds a doctorate in a social
science (Science & Technology Studies). Neither Starrs nor
the author claimed to be able to analyze latent prints. All
three defense experts testified that latent print
individualization had not been validated. Thus, broadly
stated, they did not “accept” latent print individualization.

TABLE 1. General acceptance of the validity of latent print
individualization among non-practitioners based on expert
testimony, c. 1999.
Acceptors
No. Name
1.

Title

Bruce
Budowle

Affiliation
Federal Bureau
of Investigation

Degre Institution

Discipline

e
PhD

Biology

Degre Institution

Discipline

e
BA

St. John’s
University

English

University of
California,
Berkeley
Cornell
University

Forensic
Science

Non-Acceptors
No. Name

Title

Affiliation

1.

James
Starrs

Professor

The George
Washington
University
School of Law
and Forensic
Science Program
McCrone
PhD
Institute

2.

David
Stoney

Director

3.

Simon
Cole

Postdoctora Institute for
l Fellow
Health Care
Policy, Rutgers
University

PhD

Science &
Technolog
y Studies

The state of the scientific community at the time of the
Mitchell hearing seems to be against admissibility under
Frye (Table 1). Latent print individualization was selfcertified by thousands of its own practitioners, but the
government was able to identify only a single non201

. Trial Transcript, July 12, 1999, at 37, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (Dr.
Stoney).
202
. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 228.
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practitioner, credentialed scientist to say he “accepted”
latent print individualization. Moreover, one might imagine
that the fact that this single scientist happened to be an FBI
employee would raise alarms for the court. In contrast, the
defense was able to point to three non-practitioner
scientists or scholars who did not accept the validity of
latent print individualization. To be sure, the defense
witnesses had weaknesses as well. The government could
have pointed to Professor Starrs’s lack of a doctoral degree,
or the fact that the author was a social, not a natural,
scientist. However, it would seem that these objections
would be overcome by Starrs’s position as a Professor of
both Law and Forensic Science at a prestigious university
and the fact that the author’s training was in a social
science discipline whose precise aim was to seek to
understand the nature of scientific knowledge claims. In
any case, it would seem difficult to see how a court would
construe this lineup as “acceptance” unless it was relying
on acceptance among practitioners. Only by excluding nonpractitioners from the “relevant scientific community” could
a court find latent print individualization generally
accepted.

b. Amicus Curiae Briefs
One possible objection to basing a general acceptance
evaluation on expert testimony is that the numbers are
necessarily small. Taking expert testimony is a slow and
unwieldy method of gauging the views of “relevant
scientific community.” A court might hesitate to rule a form
of evidence, especially such a venerable form of evidence
as latent print evidence, inadmissible based on the
testimony of three individuals, even if they outnumbered
their counterparts threefold.
One way of more efficiently getting the views of the
“relevant scientific community” before the court is through
amicus curiae briefs. By soliciting multiple signatories on a
single brief, parties can convey the extent of support for a
particular scientific proposition without overburdening the
court with the testimony of each individual under oath.
Amicus curiae briefs are relatively uncommon in the lower
courts that have heard the majority of the admissibility
challenges to latent print evidence. However, one appellate
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court, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, did
solicit amicus briefs pursuant to an interlocutory appeal of a
denial of a motion to exclude latent print evidence.
Although three briefs were submitted, two were submitted
on behalf of legal organizations. One brief, however, is
pertinent to assessing the acceptance of latent print
individualization in the “relevant scientific community.” This
brief was submitted by the New England Innocence Project
on behalf of fifteen scientists and scholars (including the
author of this article).203 All fifteen scientists and scholars
agreed that latent print individualization lacked validation.
The composition of the amici was varied. Fourteen of
the fifteen held terminal degrees (Ph.D. or J.D., several of
them held both), the remaining signatory held a master’s
degree in Forensic Science. The amici came from a variety
of disciplines: Biology, Mathematics, Statistics, Law, Political
Science, Psychology, Linguistics, and Science & Technology
Studies.204 These disciplinary backgrounds reflect the fact,
discussed above, that there is no single discipline in whose
domain the problem of latent print individualization
obviously falls. Contrary to common stereotypes about “the
academic brief” being signed by scholars with no
professional publications or knowledge about the issue at
hand,205 all but one of the signatories of this particular Brief
have published articles or given conference presentations
that deal, at least in part, with the issue of the validity of
latent print individualization.206 In the Patterson case the
government was not able to identify any additional nonpractitioners who “accepted” the claim of the validity of
latent print individualization.
203

. David M. Siegel et al., The Reliability of Latent Print
Individualization: Brief of Amici Curiae of Scientists, Scholars, and the
New England Innocence Project, Commonwealth v. Patterson, 42 CRIM. L.
BULL. 21, 21 (2006).
204
. Id.
205
. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES, 104-105 (2008).
206
. The exception is Professor Feinberg, who co-organized a 2005
National Academy of Science symposium on forensic science which
included discussion of the validity of latent print individualization.
National Academy of Sciences, Sackler Colloquium on Forensic Science,
http://www.nasonline.org/site/Page
Server?
JServSessionIdr001=wyea1ev6u1.app14b&pagename=sackler_forensic
(last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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The Patterson case changed the general acceptance
outlook substantially (Table 2). Although the majority of
meta-experts had not accepted the validity of latent print
individualization even at the time of Mitchell, their raw
numbers were relatively small. By the time of Patterson,
however, the number was significantly larger, which should
have helped assuage any concerns that the court may have
had about being misled by a small number of fringe
scientists. Most of the new meta-experts presumably had
been drawn to examine the validity claims of latent print
individualization by the publicity generated by earlier
admissibility challenges to latent print individual-ization.
Moreover, while there was no good reason to treat the
Mitchell-era scientists and scholars as “fringe,” any such
concerns should have been put to rest by the time of
Patterson. While determined advocates could always
impugn the motives or credentials of one or more of the
Patterson-era scientists and scholars, there is quite simply
no way to interpret the entire list as “fringe.” Finally, aside
from raw numbers, the trend of opinions at the time of
Patterson was quite clear. While more and more nonpractitioner scientists and scholars were supporting the
claim that latent print individualization was not yet
validated, few were supporting the opposite position. Thus,
even if the state of general acceptance was clear at the
time of Mitchell, by the time of Patterson it was even
clearer.

TABLE 2. General acceptance of the validity of latent print
individualization among non-practitioners based on amicus
curiae briefs, c. 2005.
Acceptors
No. Name

Title

Affiliation

Degre Institution

Discipline

e
None

Non-Acceptors
No. Name
1.

Mark
Acree

Title

Affiliation

Degre Institution

Principal

e
Apex Consulting MSFS

Discipline

University of Forensic
Alabama,
Science
Birmingham

SIMON A. COLE, "OUT OF THE DAUBERT FIRE AND INTO THE FRYEING PAN? SELF-VALIDATION, META-EXPERTISE AND
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE IN FRYE JURISDICTIONS," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 453-542
(2008).

508

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

No. Name

Title

2.

Robert
Bradley
David
Faigman
Stephen
Fienber
g
Paul
Giannell
i

Professor

6.

Lyn
Haber

Principal

7.

Ralph
Haber

Professor
Emeritus

8.

Donald
Kenned
y
Jennifer
Mnookin

Professor;
President
Emeritus
Professor

3.
4.

5.

9.

Professor
Maurice
Falk
Professor
Richard
Weathered
Professor

10. Joëlle
Professor
Anne
Moreno
11. Jane
Professor
Moriarty
12. D.
Professor
Michael
Risinger
13. John
Professor
Vokey
14. Sandy
Professor
Zabell

Affiliation

[Vol. 9:2

Degre Institution

Discipline

e
Illinois State
PhD
University of Political
University
Kentucky
Science
Hastings School MA, JD University of Psycholog
of Law
Virginia
y; Law
Carnegie Mellon PhD
Harvard
Statistics
University
University
Case Western
University
School of Law

MS, JD, The George
LLM
Washington
University;
University of
Virginia
Human Factors PhD
University of
Consultants
California,
Berkeley
University of
PhD
Stanford
California, Santa
University
Cruz
Stanford
PhD
Harvard
University
University

Forensic
Science;
Law

Linguistics

Psycholog
y
Biology

University of
California, Los
Angeles

PhD;
JD

New England
School of Law

JD

University of
Akron School of
Law
Seton Hall
School of Law

JD

Boston
College

Law

JD

Harvard
University

Law

University of
Lethbridge
Northwestern
University

PhD

McMaster
University
Harvard
University

Psycholog
y

PhD

MIT; Yale
University

Science &
Technolog
y Studies;
Law
University of Law
Pennsylvania

Mathematic
s

c. Published Literature
Perhaps the most common method of evaluating
general acceptance is by examining the published
literature.207 It is where scientists and scholars take most
207

. (“In general, the proponent of the evidence should prove general
acceptance by surveying scientific publications. Studies demonstrating
the validity of new (or old) methods, appearing without contradiction in
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seriously the notion of being held to the arguments to
which they sign their names. Put simply, scientists and
scholars expect to defend the arguments they make in
published literature. Therefore, a court seeking to assess
the state of general acceptance of a particular proposition
might do well to survey the scientific literature speaking to
that proposition. Courts have indicated approval of the
notion of referring to the scientific and legal literature in
making assessments of general acceptance.208 As Judge
Altenbernd, put it, “[t]he Frye standard is not a direct
measure of scientific trustworthiness. Instead, it is based on
the assumption that the science will be trustworthy if
scientists worthy of trust have published articles and made
public statements in support of the scientific principle or
procedure.”209
There is almost no discussion of latent print validation
in the forensic science literature. The most prestigious
forensic journals (Journal of Forensic Sciences and Forensic
Science International) contain some material on the
development and imaging of latent prints, on the variability
of friction ridge skin,210 on fingerprint forgery,211 and one
prominent scientific journals, reference works, or textbooks, are perhaps
the best indicia of general acceptance.”) (emphasis added); Giannelli,
supra note 10, at 1217.
2
208
. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1376 (Cal. 1982) (“[S]cientists
have long been permitted to speak to the courts through their published
writings in scholarly treatises and journals.”); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d
1240, 1247 (Cal. 1976) (“[A]mici have cited a number of scientific and
legal articles containing differing forms of opposition to the admissibility
of voiceprint evidence. Such writings may be considered by courts in
evaluating the reliability of new scientific methodology.”).
2
209
. Brim v. State, 779 So. 2d 427, 435–36 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000) (citation
omitted).
2
210
. See, e.g., Nicole Egli et al., Evidence Evaluation in Fingerprint
Comparison and Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems—Modeling
Within Finger Variability, 167 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 189 (2006); C. H. Lin et al.,
Fingerprint Comparison I: Similarity of Fingerprints, 27 J. FORENSIC SCI. 290
(1982); Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in
Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Any Number of Minutiae, 52
J. FORENSIC SCI. 54 (2007); Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood
Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Three Minutiae, 51
J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2006); David A. Stoney & John I. Thornton, A Critical
Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality Models, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI.
1187 (1986); John I. Thornton, The DNA Statistical Paradigm vs.
Everything Else, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 758 (1997); John I. Thornton, The
Snowflake Paradigm, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 399 (1986).
2
211
. Boris Geller et al., Fingerprint Forgery—A Survey, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI.
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report on proficiency testing,212 but essentially no
discussion of validation.213 There is a short discussion of
latent print validation in a less well known forensic journal,
but that article essentially conceded lack of validation and
characterized latent print individual-ization as a “leap of
faith.”214
Beyond the general forensic science literature, there is
also narrower literature on forensic identification, an area in
which latent prints are an important component.215 Taken
together, these sources provide substantial literature about
latent print identification. But does this literature support
the case for general acceptance?
One might first question whether this constitutes
scientific literature.216 My argument here, however, need
not rely on such unkind insinuations. Even if we grant
journals such as JFI status as a full-fledged scientific journal,
the fact of the matter is that almost nothing in it addresses
the validity of latent print individualization, and nothing at
731 (2001); Boris Geller et al., A Chronological Review of Fingerprint
Forgery, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI. 963 (1999).
212
. Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory
Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-1991, II: Resolving Questions of
Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009 (1995).
213
. It is perhaps worth nothing that a review in the Journal of Forensic
Sciences of the author’s book, that makes the claim that latent print
individualization has not been validated, makes no mention of the fact
that the book makes this claim. One might imagine that such a claim
would be of importance, or at least interest, to forensic scientists. James
A. Bailey, A Review of Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and
Criminal Identification 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 476–77 (2003).
214
. David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize
Using Statistics?, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC'Y 197 (1991).
215
. The “flagship journal” in this area is clearly the Journal of Forensic
Identification (JFI). Other journals include Fingerprint Whorld and The
Print. In addition, a great deal of latent print practitioner literature is also
“published” online. Important web sites that post original articles include
www.clpex.com, www.forensic-evidence.com, Fingerprints.tk (www.
xs4all.nl/
~dacty/index.htm),
Ridges
and
Furrows
(www.ridgesandfurrows.homestead. com/index.html), and www.latentprints.com.
216
. The online articles are neither peer reviewed nor subjected to a
selective publication process; print journals are peer reviewed, though not
all categories of articles are peer reviewed; and the editorial boards of a
number of journals have members who are less than fully credentialed
(the JFI, the leading publication, has just over half with advanced—
master’s or above—degrees in science). Many contributors are not
scientists.
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all in it provides evidence in support of the validity of latent
print individualization. It contains almost no articles dealing
with the topic of the validity of latent print individualization.
Those few articles that do address validity are
unsatisfactory in terms of providing support for the claim.
Some steer around the issue altogether.217
A careful reading of these articles reveals that they
contain no references to any studies, data, or other
evidence supporting the validity of latent print
individualization. In sum, though the practitioner literature
is substantial and useful for arbitrating important questions
like how best to image latent prints, none of it directly
addresses the validity question,218 and therefore, is simply
irrelevant to the question of whether the validity claims of
latent print individualization are generally accepted. By
contrast, the legal and scientific literature cited in note 241,
does address the question of the validity of latent print
individualization, and it is this literature that a court seeking
to evaluate the general acceptance of latent print
individualization should turn.

Anatomical Literature
One category of literature not represented in note 241
is anatomical literature. Some latent print proponents have
argued that anatomy is the “science” in which latent print
217

. A case in point is a recent article written by Wertheim and Maceo
that mentions validity in its opening paragraph and never broaches the
topic again. Kasey Wertheim & Alice Maceo, The Critical Stage of Friction
Ridge Pattern Formation, 52 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 35 (2002); see also
Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 35. In an email, one of the
authors argued that my critique was unfair because the article was not
intended to address the validity of latent print individualization, just
“biological uniqueness.” That’s fine, but it supports my argument that
validity is simply unaddressed in the practitioner literature. Instead, the
article is an extended effort to explicate the “biological uniqueness” of
friction ridge skin, an issue that, as already stated here and elsewhere in
the literature, is irrelevant to the validity of latent print individualization.
See, e.g., Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 35.
Other articles simply declare the validity of latent print
individualization. John D. “Dusty” Clark, ACE-V: Is It Scientifically Reliable
and Accurate?, 52 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 401 (2002); Kasey Wertheim,
Letter re: ACE-V: Is It Scientifically Reliable and Accurate?, 52 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 669 (2002).
218
. This argument is made in greater detail in Cole, Fingerprint
Identification, supra note 35.
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individualization is rooted,219 and some courts have
endorsed this argument.220 It is true that there is a
substantial body of literature concerning the formation and
variability of friction ridge skin. Should this literature be
considered evidence of general acceptance of latent print
individualization in the relevant scientific community? Can
anatomists constitute the relevant scientific community for
the issue of latent print individualization, and, if so, do they
generally accept it?
Generally speaking, those anatomists who do research
on friction ridge skin do not concern themselves with the
accuracy of latent print individualization. Their research
interest is in the formation of friction ridge skin and, to a
lesser extent, its function. At times, they have offered
opinions as to the uniqueness of friction ridge skin. One
anatomist, William Babler, testified to such an opinion in
the admissibility hearing in Mitchell. But, neither Babler nor
any other anatomist has ever offered an opinion, in print, as
to the accuracy of latent print individualization. This is why
Babler is not included on Tables 1–3.
Perhaps the best way to delineate the anatomical
literature is to refer to a bibliography of 120 references
submitted into evidence by the government in the first
Daubert
admissibility
challenge
in
Mitchell.
The
bibliography was offered in response to both the “peer
review and publication” and the “general acceptance”
prongs of Daubert.221 It’s an impressive body of literature.
However, none of the anatomical literature cited in this
bibliography addresses the issue of the validity of latent
print individualization. Some of the literature addresses the
formation of friction ridge skin, some of it discusses looking
for correlations between friction ridge skin patterns and
disease or behavioral characteristics, some if it explores
whether ethnicity can be predicted from friction ridge skin
patterns, and some seeks to trace ancestry through friction
ridge skin patters. None of this is directly relevant to
attributions of the source of latent prints by professional
219

. DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY (1999).
220
. Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
221
. (“there is extensive peer review and widespread acceptance of
the basis [sic] method of fingerprint analysis.”).
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latent print examiners.
Let me offer some support for this assertion. At the
time of the Mitchell hearing, I estimate that I had already
read thirty-one of the sources listed in the bibliography
through my own research on the history of fingerprinting.222
I knew, from having read these sources, that very few of
them even addressed the validity of latent print
individualization,223 and those that did, stated that it had
not been validated.224 At least one was a history book that
had little to say about validation.225 At least one of the
sources explicitly eschewed discussion of latent print
evidence altogether, leading one to wonder why it was
included on the list at all.226 I, therefore, suspected that the
remainder of the sources did not address validity either. In
order to make a provisional test of this hypothesis, I
selected twenty-seven sources that seemed, based on their
titles most likely to contain information about latent print
individualization. In this exercise, I excluded sources that
seemed least likely to contain information about latent print
individualization. For example, I excluded a book entitled
Handbook of Mathemeatical [sic] Functions, with Formulas,
Graphs, and Mathematical Tables, another entitled
Statistics, and another entitled Evolution.227 (However, out
2

222

. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION (2001).
2
223
. For example, some of the better known sources address only the
formation or uniqueness of friction ridge skin, not the accuracy of latent
print individualization. FRANCIS GALTON, FINGER PRINTS (1892); HARRIS HAWTHORNE
WILDER & BERT WENTWORTH, PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION: METHODS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF
INDIVIDUALS, LIVING OR DEAD (1918); HAROLD CUMMINS & CHARLES MIDLO, FINGER PRINTS,
PALMS AND SOLES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DERMATOGLYPHICS (1943). For more detail on
this argument, see Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 35.
2
224
. MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David
L. Faigman et al. eds., 1st ed. 1997); I. W. Evett & R. L. Williams, A Review
of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales, 46 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 49 (1996). But see BERNARD ROBERTSON & G. A. VIGNAUX,
INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 137 (1995). But
this discussion largely elides discussion of validity, concluding only that
“Fingerprint identification is a matter of expert judgment.” Id. at 146.
2
225
. IDENTIFICATION WANTED: DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION
SYSTEM, 1893-1943 (Donald C. Dilworth ed.) (1977).
2
226
. COLIN G.G. AITKEN, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC
SCIENTISTS 132 (1995). (“Evaluation of fingerprint evidence is not discussed
here.”).
2
227
. I subsequently obtained Evolution. There do not appear to be any
references to fingerprinting, latent prints, or even to friction ridge skin.
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of curiousity, I included Grey’s Anatomy, even though I did
not expect that it would have much to say about the
validity of latent print individualization.) I assigned a
research assistant to look up these articles and search
them for any reference to latent print identification (not
specifically to validity). Many of the sources were old or in
relatively obscure journals, and my assistant was unable to
locate nine of the sources. (It should be noted that this
search was conducted at a branch of the largest research
library in the world.)228 To be sure, more diligent searching
might eventually unearth more of these sources. In
addition, if the source was not available in the University of
California Libraries, we did not choose to entail the costs of
interlibrary loan. But I am satisfied that such measures
were not necessary as explained below.
Of the eighteen sources that were successfully
retrieved, only five of them even remotely discussed latent
print identification at all. The remainder discussed the
embryological formation of friction ridge skin, the
inheritance
of
friction
ridge
skin
patterns,
or
“dermatoglyphics,” the interpretation of friction ridge skin
patterns. At least one did not even contain the word
“fingerprint.”229 Another concerned the formation of skin in
general, not even specifically friction ridge skin.230 (In
addition, according to my assistant, Grey’s Anatomy does
not discuss fingerprinting at all.) Of the five that did discuss
latent print identification, one discussed the identification of
prints by automated systems not humans,231 and two stated
The following search terms were not found in the index: fingerprints,
hands, papillary, friction, skin, epidermis, palm.
228
. The University of California libraries, http://libraries.universityof
california.edu/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
229
. See, e.g., Sumiko Kimura & Tadashi Kitagawa, Embryological
Development of Human Palmar, Plantar, and Digital Flexion Creases 216
ANATOMICAL REC. 191 (1986).
230
. B. Allen Flaxman & Paul F. A. Maderson, Growth and
Differentiation of Skin, 67 J. INVESTIGATIVE DERMATOLOGY 8 (1976).
231
. Andrea A. Roddy & Jonathan Stosz, Fingerprint Features—
Statistical Analysis and System Performance Estimates, 85 PROC. IEEE
1390 (1997). Automated systems are used to search for candidate
matches in a database, not to determine the source of a latent print. Their
performance at this task does not determine the accuracy of source
attributions made by human examiners. In any case, human examiners
claim higher accuracy rates than the measured performance of
automated systems.
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that
fingerprints
were
“useful”
for
individual
identification.232 Only two directly addressed the issue of
accuracy.233 One of these asserted that latent print
identification was “accurate,” and both claimed it was
“infallible.”234 A closer examination of these two authorities
revealed no studies, data, or evidence supporting these
assertions but only ipse dixit declarations. Chatterjee
declared that “it was proved scientifically that identification
from fingerprints was infallible,” but offered no indication as
to what proof this statement refers.235 The only proof
discussed in the remainder of the article was Galton’s
purported proof of the persistence of friction ridge
details.236 Puri stated that “[i]t is now an established fact
that the science of fingerprints is an exact one and the
most accurate method of human identification.”237 Again,
there was no indication as to what it was that supposedly
“established” this “fact.” Puri made reference to court
decisions that supposedly “show that identification through
fingerprints is flawless and infallible,”238 but of course a
court decision can show no such thing.239 The remainder of
the article was devoted to the “identical twins” argument in
favor of the uniqueness of friction ridge skin, which, again,
invokes the fingerprint examiner’s fallacy and fails to
address the validity of latent print individualization.
With more resources, I could go through the whole list.
2

232

. S.M.S. Bhalla, Can the Science of Fingerprints Be Stifled by Human
Ingenuity or Manipulation, 15 J. INDIAN ACAD. FORENSIC SCI. 24 (1976); Ralph M.
Garruto & C.C. Plato, Fingerprints, Palms, and Soles: Historical
Transitions, 27 BIRTH DEFECTS ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES 7, 10 (1991) reprinted in
DERMATOGLYPHICS: SCIENCE IN TRANSITION (C.C. Plato et al. eds., 1991) (which is the
work cited in the government’s bibliography).
2
233
. K. S. Puri, Do Monovular Twins Have Identical Fingerprints?, INT’L
CRIM. POLICE REV. 45 (1968); S. K. Chatterjee, Origin of Fingerprint Science
and Its Development During Last 75 Years, 13 J. INDIAN ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCI.
2 (1974).
2
234
. Puri, supra note 233, at 45; Chatterjee, supra note 233, at 2.
2
235
. Chatterjee, supra note 233, at 2.
2
236
. Id. at 3.
2
237
. Puri, supra note 233, at 45.
2
238
. Id.
2
239
. Courts do not typically perform validation studies. A legal opinion
cannot provide evidence of validation unless that decision refers to some
study or data that does provide validation. For more detail on this
argument, see Simon A. Cole, ‘Implicit Testing’: Can Casework Validate
Forensic Techniques?, 46 JURIMETRICS 117 (2006).
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However, at this point I am convinced that it is extremely
unlikely that the Mitchell bibliography contains a hidden
gem that demonstrates the validity of latent print
individualization. I suspect that if there were such a gem,
the government would have pointed it out in Mitchell or a
subsequent case. Therefore, at this point, I am willing to
take the risk of being proven wrong.
Thus, the anatomical literature cannot provide evidence
in support of the general acceptance of latent print
individualization. Moreover, anatomists do not constitute
the relevant scientific community for the matter of the
validity of latent print individualization for the simple
reason that they have evinced in their published literature
no interest whatsoever in this question. Anatomists are the
relevant scientific community for questions that do fall
within their interest and expertise.240 But, if a court is
interested in literature that addresses the validity of latent
print individualization it is to another (largely legal) body of
literature that it must turn.

Literature on the Validity of Latent Print
Individualization
A glance at the legal and scientific literature reveals
authorities by twenty different authors or sets of authors
attesting to the lack of validation of latent print
individualization.241 It also reveals authorities by two
240

. Questions such as: How is friction ridge skin formed? What is its
biological function? To what degree are friction ridge skin patterns
inherited? Do certain friction ridge patterns correlate with disease or
behavioral propensities or ethnic groups?
241
. See DAVID FAIGMAN, ET AL, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 27-2.3.1, at 386 (2nd ed. 2002) (“Woe to fingerprint
practice were such [Daubert admissibility] criteria applied.”); Michael
Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 1069, 1106 (1998)
(“By conventional scientific standards, any serious search for evidence of
the validity of fingerprint identification is going to be disappointing. . . . A
vote to admit fingerprints is a rejection of conventional science as the
criterion for admission. A vote for science is a vote to exclude fingerprint
expert opinions.”); James E. Starrs, Judicial Control Over Scientific
Supermen: Fingerprint Experts and Others Who Exceed the Bounds, 35
CRIM. L. BULL. 234 (1999) (“Instead of meaning incapable of error,
fingerprint identifications are declared to be infallible on account of the
uniqueness of fingerprints to each person . . .”); David A. Stoney,
Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY
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authors holding the opposite position.242 These two lists of
authorities unequivocally strengthen the case against the
general acceptance of latent print individualization
validity.243
Many of the scholars who produced this literature have
already been accounted for in our previous two surveys.
Indeed, most of the entrants in our previous two tables
produced some published literature. “New entrants” to the
field are reported in Table 3: those scholars who appear in a
survey of the literature but did not already appear in our
327, 383 (H. C. Lee and R. E. Gaensslen eds., 2001) (“From a statistical
viewpoint, the scientific foundation for fingerprint individuality is
incredibly weak.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence In An Age of
DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001) (“In the case of fingerprinting,
the general rate of error is simply not known.”); SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001); David L.
Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers? 297 SCIENCE 339 (2002)
(fingerprinting has “not been seriously tested”); Paul Giannelli,
Fingerprints Challenged! 17 CRIM. JUST. 33, 35 (Spring 2002) (“In its
interpretation of Daubert, Plaza I is a well-written opinion. Havvard is
not.”); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint
“Science” is Revealed, 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 605, 657 (2002) (“Having
considered the various indicators of reliability set forth by the Supreme
Court in Daubert, it is evident that at the present time, latent fingerprint
identifications do not constitute reliable evidence.”); Jessica M. Sombat,
Latent Justice: Daubert’s Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint
Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819, 2825 (2002) (“the result
Judge Pollak reached when he excluded expert testimony concerning
fingerprints [in Llera Plaza I] was fair.”); Recent Case, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2349, 2352 (2002) (“Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive
application of the Daubert factors . . .”); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman
Haber, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339 (N. K. Ratha & R. Bolle eds., 2004) (“no data have
been collected on how accurately latent print examiners match different
images of the same finger.”); Donald Kennedy, Forensic Science:
Oxymoron? 302 SCIENCE 1625 (2003) (Fingerprinting’s “reliability is
unverified either by statistical models of fingerprint variation or by
consistent data on error rates.”); David H. Kaye, The Nonscience of
Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera Plaza, 21 QLR 1073, 1087 (2003)
(“As Llera-Plaza I so clearly reveals, this [the evidence advanced in
support of the admissibility of latent fingerprint individualization] does not
satisfy Daubert.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard,
20 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 47 (2003) (“Judge Pollak’s first opinion [restricting
latent fingerprint individualization testimony] was the better one.”);
Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie? Re-weighing Fingerprint
Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 65 (2003) (“Currently
fingerprint analysis is under attack because of the lack of study done on
the accuracy of the examiners . . .”); Tara Marie La Morte, Sleeping
Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the Unreliability of Forensic
Fingerprinting Evidence under Daubert, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 171, 173
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surveys of expert witnesses and amici. In this table, I have
tried to include all scholarly articles that directly address
the issue of the validity of latent print individualization. As a
scholar whose work focuses on the problem of the validity
and admissibility of latent print individualization, I relied on
my own research and literature searches to compile this
survey.
It should be noted that, like the other tables, Table 3 is
a table of scholars, not of published works. Scholarship is
measured as an indicator of the views of the scholar who
(2003) (discussing “strong indications that the fingerprinting field should
not survive a rigorous Daubert analysis.”); JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 12:15 (2004) (“The
assumption of the validity of fingerprinting rests upon law, rather than
science.”); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint
Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1215 (2004) (“It is clear that no studies exist that
measure the accuracy of fingerprint examiners when they make
conclusions of identification.”); Nathan Benedict, Fingerprints and the
Daubert Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints
Fail and a Proposed Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 538 (2004) (“. . . judges
have generally relied on their instincts and the long history of judicial
acceptance of fingerprint evidence to admit it without serious
consideration of the science behind it.”); Zabell, supra note 35, at 178
(“ACE-V is an acronym, not a methodology.”) (emphasis in the original);
Michael Mears & Therese M. Day, The Challenge of Fingerprint
Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally Charged Client, 19 GA.
St. U. L. Rev. 705, 745 (2003) (“Those forensic experts who have
examined this issue, as opposed to those whose livelihood depends upon
perpetuating the misconception that fingerprint analysis is based upon
the scientific method, have found the fingerprint field to be scientifically
deficient.”). Not all of the cited quotations refer directly to lack of
validation. (See, for example, the quotation from Professor Zabell.)
However, in all of the cited works, the overall message of the article is
one of non-acceptance. Moreover, many of the authors (such as Zabell)
also gave further indication of their views by signing the amicus brief
discussed above.
242
. André Moenssens, Fingerprint Identification: A Valid Reliable
“Forensic Science”?, 18 CRIM. JUST. 31 (2003); Stephen M. Stigler, Galton
and Identification by Fingerprints, 140 GENETICS 857 (1995); Stephen M.
Stigler, The Fingerprint Controversy, 20 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 12, (Winter,
2004). Professor Moenssens has been quite clear in his views. I am
including the other scholar, Professor Stigler in the conservative spirit of
interpreting the evidence in the light least favorable to my argument.
At the same time, I want to be careful to be fair to Professor Stigler. I
must confess that I suspect that were the issue presented as sharply as I
have endeavored to do here Professor Stigler’s views might turn out to be
more consistent with the “non-acceptors” views than his published
writings indicate.
But this is mere supposition on my part, and I
characterize him as an “acceptor” here in the conservative spirit of
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produced it. Therefore, I have included each scholar as a
single line item, no matter how many works addressing the
validity of latent print individualization the scholar has
produced. This seems the fairest way to proceed so as not
to allow the counts to be dominated by a small number of
scholars who produce a large numbers of works repeatedly
drawing the same conclusion. A small number of scholars’
views were difficult to categorize,244 and they are not
included in Table 3.
As Table 3 indicates, a survey of the published
literature further strengthens the case against the general
acceptance of latent print individualization. A survey of the
published literature adds two highly credentialed scholars
to the list of acceptors, but ten more non-acceptors. If we
remove Mr. Epstein and Mr. Mears and Ms. Day, on the
grounds that they have been adversaries in an admissibility
challenge to latent print evidence, that leaves eight new
non-acceptors. It is also important to note that, a survey of
interpreting the evidence in the light least favorable to my argument.
243
. See also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Comment, The Validity of Latent
Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW
PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008).
244
. Principally, this refers to the group of scientists including and
surrounding Professor Champod. Their views have been expressed in
numerous articles and a comprehensive book: Christophe Champod,
Edmond Locard—Numerical Standards and ‘Probable’ Identifications, 45 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 136 (1995); Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A
Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
101 (2001); CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD ET AL., FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER RIDGE SKIN IMPRESSIONS
(2004). Although these scholars express confidence in latent print
identification, they also acknowledge that it has not been validated and
characterize its conclusions as based on a “leap of faith.” CHAMPOD ET AL.,
supra at 33. This characterization is consistent with that of Dr. Stoney,
who has testified for defendants in admissibility challenges. David A.
Stoney, Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 55 (Faigman, et al. eds.,
1997). But Champod et al. have not so testified. In addition, they reject
the concept of “individualization,” Champod, supra; Champod & Evett,
supra; CHAMPOD ET AL., supra, which is fundamental to contemporary latent
print practice, at least in the United States. See Scientific Working Group
on Friction Ridge Analysis Study and Technology, Friction Ridge
Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, 3 (2002), available
at
http://www.
swgfast.org/Friction_Ridge_Examination_Methodology_for_Latent_Print_Ex
aminers_1.01.pdf. Under these circumstances, it does not seem justified
to characterize these excellent scholars as either “acceptors” or “nonacceptors.”
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published literature alone would be even more lopsided
than Table 3 indicates because most of the entrants on
Tables 1 and 2 have produced published literature. The
relative number of authorities in notes 241 and 242 give
some indication of what a survey of the published literature
would look like.

TABLE 3. General acceptance of the validity of latent print
individualization among non-practitioners not listed in Table
1 or 2 based on published literature.
Acceptors
Name
1

2

Title

Affiliatio

n
André
Douglas University
Moenssen Stripp
of
s
Professor Missouri,
of Law
Kansas
City
Stephen
Ernest
University
Stigler
DeWitt
of Chicago
Burton
Distinguished
Service
Professor

Deg Institution

Discipline Publ’n

.
JD,
LLM

Law

Criminal
Justice

Mathematic

Genetics;
Issues in
Science &
Technolog
y

Illinois
Institute of
Technology;
Northwester
n University

PhD

s

Non-Acceptors
Name

Title

Affiliatio

Deg Institution

Discipline Publ’n

n

.
JD

?

Law

1

Nathan
Benedict

Law
student

2

Margaret
Berger

Professor Brooklyn
Law
School

JD

?

Law

3

Robert
Epstein

Attorney

JD

Harvard
University

Law

4

David
Kaye

Professor Arizona
JD
State
University
School of
Law

?

Law

Federal
Defender

Arizona
Law
Review
American
Journal of
Public
Health
Southern
California
Law
Review
Quinnipiac
Law
Review;
Int’l
Statistical
Review
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Title

5

Tara Marie Law
La Morte
student

6

Tamara
Lawson

7

Michael
Saks

8

Katherine Law
Schwingha student
mmer

9

Jessica
Sombat

Deg Institution

Discipline Publ’n

n

.
JD

Law

?

Professor St.
JD
?
Thomas
School of
Law
Professor Arizona
PhD Ohio State
State
University
University
School of
Law

Law
student
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Affiliatio

JD

Fordham
JD
University
School of
Law

?

Fordham
University

Albany
Law
Journal of
Science &
Technolog
y
Law
American
Journal of
Criminal
Law
Psycholog Numerous
y
law review
articles,
Modern
Scientific
Evidence
Law
American
Journal of
Criminal
Law
Law
Fordham
Law
Review

At this point, by the most conservative accounting, the
“score” in the scientific community stands at twenty-five to
three against acceptance.245 In summary, we can conclude
that non-acceptors have always outnumbered acceptors
and that the difference is becoming more pronounced as
time goes on. As of this writing, a significant number of
non-practitioner scientists and scholars have expressed
clear opinions that latent print individualization lacks
validation. At the same time, the government and
fingerprint community have shown remarkably little
245

. I certainly recognize the crudity of “keeping score” in this manner.
It should be noted, however, that for many years a prominent latent print
examiner web site featured a “Daubert score” in the upper right corner of
its home page recording the number of victories for latent print
identification in Daubert admissibility challenges. Although still in use as
recently as 2007, the “score” has now been discontinued. See Latent Print
Examination, http://onin.com/fp/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2008). To see the
“score,” see Latent Print Examination (via the Internet Archive: The Way
Back
Machine),
http://web.archive.org/web/20070702092813/http://www.onin.com/fp/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2008)
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success at finding any non-practitioner scientist or scholar
to take the position that latent print individualization has
been validated. The result of a Frye analysis, therefore,
should be clear.

4. Anticipated Objections
As noted above, one of the characteristics of the Frye
admissibility regime is that designations of the “relevant
scientific community” are highly contestable. One might
anticipate that proponents of latent print evidence would
object to the constitution of the relevant scientific
community, as I have construed it in the preceding section.
First, one might object that the scientists and scholars
in Tables 1 and 2 consist simply of paid defense experts
and that their opinions are, therefore, of no value. Some
scholars have argued that individuals with a substantial
pecuniary, or even a non-pecuniary, interest, should be
excluded from a properly constituted relevant scientific
community in a proper Frye analysis.246 One might arguably
exclude the opinions of up to five members of Tables 1–2
on this ground because they have testified on behalf of
criminal defendants in challenges to latent print
evidence.247 However, the need to exclude these five
individuals is debatable because even those scholars who
argue for the exclusion of interested experts suggest that
the test should be applied carefully and should only exclude
experts whose “livelihood,” to quote the Michigan Supreme
Court, is “intimately connected with the new technique.” 248
Thus, under this careful test, it is not clear that these
individuals should necessarily be excluded at all.
However, even if they are excluded, the overall
acceptance picture does not change because the non246

.
. Professor Starrs, Drs. Haber and Haber, Professor Faigman, and
the author.
248
. People v. Young, 391 N.W.2d 270, 276 n.24 (Mich. 1986); see also
Schwartz, supra note 33, at 210. The court’s reasoning that “a certain
degree of ‘interest’ must be tolerated if scientists familiar with the theory
and practice of a new technique are to testify at all,” id. at 210–11, is
supported by the fact that elimination of the five meta-experts who have
ever testified for defendants would eliminate some of the experts whose
knowledge of validity issue is greatest and who have written most
extensively about it.
247
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acceptors still dramatically outnumber the acceptors.
Moreover, if the opinions of those individuals who have ever
testified on behalf of criminal defendants were bracketed, it
would also be necessary to bracket the opinions of
interested government experts, whose livelihood is far
more “intimately connected” to the technique than any of
the individuals who have testified on behalf of defendants.
This would have the effect of eliminating all latent print
examiners’ opinions from consideration. It would also be
necessary to eliminate two of the three scholars who
support the claim of latent print individualization. Dr.
Budowle is an employee of the FBI, a law enforcement
agency housing the largest collection of fingerprint records
in the world. Professor Moenssens, though a distinguished
scholar, was himself a practitioner of latent print analysis.249
Thus, eliminating “interested” experts would, in fact, leave
the government in a worse position because the data would
show that latent print individualization evidence is accepted
by only one non-practitioner while still not accepted by
twenty non-practitioners.
Another potential objection to the scholars in Tables 1–
3 is that some of them are not scientists. Some scholars
have suggested that a rigorous application of Frye requires
that the relevant scientific community consist of
scientists.250 Many of the meta-experts listed on Tables 1–3
are legal scholars, some are social scientists, and two are
forensic scientists. Each of these categories might
reasonably be deemed non-scientists. Whatever the merits
of the argument to bracket the opinions of some scholars
on Tables 1–3 as non-scientists, the argument on the whole
is unconvincing. First, some individuals who may appear to
be legal scholars in fact have scientific training. One legal
scholar on Table 3, despite being a professor of law, not
only has a master’s level degree in law, but also a doctoral
degree in psychology.251 Another law professor has a
master’s degree in psychology in addition to his degree in
law, and another has a master’s degree in forensic science
249

. Andre A. Moenssens, The Fingerprint Witness in Court, 54 FINGER
PRINT & IDENTIFICATION MAG. 3 (1973).
250
.
251
. Contra People v. Clevenger, 2003 WL 22872446, *8 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (dismissing Professor Saks as a “law professor” who “does not . . .
claim to be a scientist”).
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in addition to his degree in law. Second, many of the legal
scholars on Tables 1–3 are evidence scholars and have
acquired a sophisticated understanding of scientific
arguments, methods, and procedures.252 Third, legal
scholarship is changing; currently it verges closely to the
scientific, or at least the social scientific, than it did in the
past. Although some legal scholars continue to limit
themselves
to
doctrinal,
textual
analysis,
many
contemporary legal scholars deploy sophisticated empirical
and statistical analyses.253 Fourth, given that latent print
individualization (as opposed to other uses of friction ridge
information, such as biometrics or dermatoglyphics) is
almost solely used in legal, not scientific, settings, it is
hardly surprising that legal scholars are among the most
likely members of the scholarly community to take the time
to develop a reasonably comprehensive understanding of
the evidence concerning its validity. Therefore, it might
reasonably be argued that the legal academic community
does, to some extent, constitute the relevant scientific
community for the question of the validity of latent print
individualization.
With regard to the social scientists on the list, the
question of whether or not social science should be
characterized as “science” is a hotly debated one. Even if
one concluded that it should not, two of the meta-experts
on the list (including the author) were trained in a discipline
that might be an exception. Science & Technology Studies
(STS) is a field of social science that takes science as its
object. As such, training in this discipline involves a great
deal of training, education, and thought about what makes
various propositions, theories, research programs, or
disciplines “scientific.” Individuals with this training might
be viewed as especially well equipped to assess whether or
not a body of evidence supports a particular knowledge
claim.
252

. For example, Professor Kaye is undoubtedly among the leading
legal scholars in the world in terms of his understanding of statistical
inference and also commands sophisticated knowledge of the science
that contributes to DNA testing.
253
. See Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical
Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 529 (2000); Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do
Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical Legal
Studies,” 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (forthcoming 2008).
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Finally, it might be objected that four of the entrants on
Table 3 were authored by law students. It is perhaps
appropriate to assign less weight to student-authored
publications. Nonetheless, the conventions of legal
scholarship dictate that a great deal of legal scholarship is
student-authored. Although student-authored literature is
traditionally accorded less weight than faculty-authored
material, it is not uncommon for student-authored literature
to be treated as authority in legal scholarship and indeed in
judicial opinions by even the highest courts.254 There
seems, therefore, to be no sound justification for bracketing
the opinions of student authors. In any case, even removing
student-authored material does not significantly change the
overall acceptance picture. Notably, every single studentauthored article on the subject finds that latent print
individualization has not been validated. If there were a
plasusible argument to be made that latent print
individualization has been validated, one would imagine
that some law professor would direct a student to it, as a
more interesting research and writing project than yet
another article noting the lack of validation. And yet, no
such article has appeared. Could this be because no such
argument can be made? It might perhaps be argued that all
the legal scholarship finds against validation because that
is the only side of the argument that needs articulating,
given that courts have already articulated the argument
that latent print individualization is validated. Even if this
were correct, at this point in history enough legal
scholarship finding a lack of validation has been produced
that a legal scholar or law student could today perceive the
argument for validation as one that needs articulating, in
the scholarly literature if nowhere else. Again, that no legal
scholar other than Professor Moenssens has done so might
suggest to a court undertaking a Frye analysis that the
argument is not one that legal scholars believe.
As with the elimination of interested individuals, any
strict bracketing of non-scientists actually strengthens
rather than weakens the case against general acceptance
of latent print individualization evidence. Such a procedure
254

. Bart Sloan, What Are We Writing For? Student Works as Authority
and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
221, 227 (1992).
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would eliminate the vast majority of practitioners, who lack
backgrounds in science. This would leave the technique
accepted only by a small community of practitioners who
have backgrounds in science (if one wants to label
someone with a degree in science who practices latent print
identification for a living a “scientist”) and three nonpractitioner scientists. But a significant number of nonacceptors would remain.

5. Summary
Based on the evidence assembled in Tables 1–3, a
general acceptance analysis of latent print individualization
evidence under Frye should be an easy case. As long as a
court resists the temptation to allow the practitioner
community to self-validate its own knowledge claims, the
picture is quite clear. The acceptors include only three
scholars, two of whose opinions arguably should be
eliminated because they are too closely interested. The
non-acceptors, however, include more than twenty scholars
from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives. While various
criticisms might be made of various individuals among the
non-acceptors, none applies to all of them, not even the
criticism of not being practitioners. In their totality, this
group wields a high degree of academic firepower: they
include two members of the National Academy of Science,
one of the most prestigious honors bestowed in scientists in
the United States, the former President of one of the top
five research universities in the United States, and some of
the legal academy’s most eminent evidence scholars. They
include four Harvard degrees, (the “acceptor” group
includes one). Although the motives or qualifications of
some of these individuals may be impugned, even the
elimination from consideration of a couple of them leaves
the opinions of some of the others standing. The point here
is that the weight of scholarly opinion seems to be
approaching very closely, despite all personal and
disciplinary differences, a common conclusion that latent
print individualization lacks validation. This degree of
consensus, it would seem, is precisely what the notion of
“general acceptance in the relevant scientific community”
was intended to capture.
None of this is to suggest that courts must, as a general
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rule, deem propositions unaccepted every time they are
presented with a petition containing the signature of
twenty-five people with advanced degrees, or that degrees
from fancy universities should automatically connote
authority. Deference to scientists and scholars must surely
be exercised with caution. However, in this case, the
totality of evidence of non-acceptance, combined with the
failure of the proponents of the evidence to attract any
significant support from any informed observers outside the
practitioner community would seem to be a situation that
should make a court very uncomfortable about deeming the
evidence “generally accepted.”

C. NON-NOVELTY
A common argument holds that the Frye test only
applies to “novel” expert evidence. Therefore, it is argued,
even if latent print individualization would fail a general
acceptance analysis, it would not reach that analysis
because it is not novel evidence. Since Frye postdated the
introduction of latent print evidence to U.S. courts by more
than two decades,255 this view would find that latent print
evidence was never properly the subject of Frye analysis.
The supposed non-novelty loophole has probably been one
of the chief deterrents to admissibility challenges to latent
print evidence under Frye.
In fact, the non-novelty loophole should not be treated
as an obstacle to challenging the admissibility of latent
print evidence under Frye. First, the notion that Frye limited
itself to novel evidence is a myth. The Frye opinion contains
no reference to novelty. Instead, it has been suggested that
the notion that Frye is limited to novel evidence can be
traced to a law professor.256
It is true that some state courts appear to have added a
“novelty” requirement in their cases adopting Frye.257 Other
255

. See People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Ill. 1911).
. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE , 299 (2004);
James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 252–53
(1986).
257
. See, e.g., Still v. State, 917 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005);
Dirling v. Sarasota County Gov’t, 871 So. 2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2004);
State v. Sercey, 825 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); U.S. Sugar Corp.
v. Henson, No. 1D99-27982000, 2000 WL 1880340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
256
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courts have rejected the novelty requirement.258 But even
some courts with a novelty requirement, such as the
California Supreme Court, have interpreted it to refer not
merely to new techniques, but also to new information
about the general acceptance, or even reliability, of even
time-honored techniques. People v. Kelly states that the
non-novelty loophole remains open only “until new
evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of
the scientific community.”259 Clearly, as demonstrated by
the above discussion, infra Part , the attitude of the
scientific community has been developing rapidly over the
last decade. A litigant could demonstrate the existence of
such new information, as explicated above, and such an
interpretation would, therefore, allow a Frye challenge to
latent print individualization evidence. Legal scholars agree
that “the ‘novelty’ requirement should not bar relitigation if
the scientific community changes its mind when further
research reveals that a previously trusted technique no
longer is valid.”260 This is precisely the case for latent print
evidence. Indeed, the courts’ openness to “new evidence
reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific
community” is particularly pertinent to the case of latent
print evidence where only the publicity generated by earlier
admissibility challenges drew the attention of the
mainstream scientific community to the issue of its

Dec. 29, 2000); State v. Meador, 674 So. 2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976), rev’d on other grounds;
In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004); Donaldson v.
Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill. 2002), abrogated on
other grounds; People v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2000); In re Marriage of
Alexander, 857 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. 5th 2006); People v. Cumbee, 851
N.E.2d 934 (Ill. App. 2d. 2006); In re K.T., 836 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. 3d
2005); In re Commitment of Bushong, 815 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. App. 2d 2004);
People v. Canulli, 792 N.E.2d 438 (Ill. App. 4th 2003); Owens Corning v.
Bauman, 726 A.2d 745, 767 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), abrogated on
other grounds.
258
. See, e.g., Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 408
(Mich. 2004).
259
. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245; see also Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884,
891 (Colo. 1993).
260
. John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony:
Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and
Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 367 (1992) (“no apparent reason exists . . . for
limiting the standard to ‘novel’ scientific evidence”).
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validity.261 Finally, to the extent that courts do enforce a
non-novelty loophole, they defy common sense, as legal
scholars have pointed out.262

D. NONSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Another “loophole” in Frye is that many courts refuse to
apply it to “nonscientific” evidence.263 Should this be a bar
to subjecting latent print evidence to Frye? It would seem
not. The rationale for applying the Frye test to scientific
evidence is that “it is widely agreed that propositions
perceived as ‘scientific’ by the jury possess an unusually
high degree of persuasive power.”264 Arguably, nonscientific
evidence that does not enjoy the extra degree of
persuasive power associated with “science,” need not bear
the burden of a Frye inquiry. But, while the issue of whether
latent print individualization truly is or is not properly
characterized as “science” is a contested and vexing,265
there can be little doubt that it is presented to the jury as
“science.” Therefore, it should be required to meet the Frye
261

. Andy Newman, Fingerprinting’s Reliability Draws Growing Court
Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A8; Andy Newman, Judge Rules
Fingerprints Cannot Be Called a Match, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at A14;
Seth Stern, A Harder Day in Court for Fingerprint, Writing Experts, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 16, 2002, at 2; Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie?, NEW
YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 96; David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for
Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339 (2002); Adrian Cho, Fingerprinting Doesn’t Hold
Up as a Science in Court, 295 SCIENCE 418 (2002); Shannon P. Duffy,
Philadelphia Judge Reverses Landmark Fingerprint Decision, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 14, 2003; Michael Higgins, Fingerprint Evidence Put on
Trial, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2002, at 1; Giannelli, supra note 241, at 33; Mike
Weiss, U.S. Judge Challenges ‘Science’ of Fingerprints, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb.
24, 2002, at A1; Edward Lazarus, Why Judges Rarely Change Their Minds,
LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/August, 2002, at 39.
262
.
263
. Strong, supra note 260, at 367; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Escape Hatches from Frye and Daubert: Sometimes You Don’t Need to
Lay Either Foundation in order to Introduce Expert Testimony!, 23 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1999).
264
. Strong, supra note 260, at 367.
265
. Michele Triplett & Lauren Cooney, The Etiology of ACE-V and its
Proper Use: An Exploration of the Relationship Between ACE-V and the
Scientific Method of Hypothesis Testing, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 345
(2006); André Moenssens, Is Fingerprint Identification a “Science”?, http://
www.forensic-evidence.com/site/ID/ID00004_2.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2008); Bernard W.N. Robertson, Fingerprints, Relevance and
Admissibility, 2 N.Z. RECENT L. REV. 252, 256 (1990) (“Fingerprint ‘experts’
are in fact technicians and not scientists.”).
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standard. As Professor Strong put it, “[p]ropositions
possessing significantly increased potential to influence the
trier of fact as ‘scientific’ assertions should be required to
meet scientific standards of reliability.”266

IV. FRYE RULINGS
Astonishingly, until 2007 there was no ruling that
explicitly considered the admissibility of latent print
individualization evidence under Frye. As discussed above,
this glaring lacuna was probably due to several factors
including the non-novelty loophole and the defense bar’s
assumption that such challenges were only plausible under
Daubert. There have, however, been some admissibility
rulings in Daubert or mixed jurisdictions that have
considered the issue of the general acceptance of latent
print individualization.
Many courts have reasoned that latent print evidence
satisfies the general acceptance requirement by restricting
the relevant community to fingerprint examiners or to the
forensic community.267 Some courts have relied exclusively
on general acceptance to find latent print evidence
admissible under Daubert.268

266

. Strong, supra note 260, at 368.
. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D.
Ky. 2003) (“The court finds that ACE-V is generally accepted in the
fingerprint analysis and forensic science fields . . . .”). While it would be
difficult to dispute this assertion as it concerns fingerprint examiners, it is
far less clear that it is accurate as it concerns the field of “forensic
science” more generally. In any case, although the court noted that “[t]he
plaintiff’s expert, Joy Younce, testified that ACE-V is the standard
methodology used by fingerprint examiners in analyzing fingerprints,” id.
(emphasis added), the court refers to no evidence about the state of
general acceptance among forensic scientists. See also United States. v.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340
F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Fingerprint evidence and analysis is
generally accepted.”); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d. 261, 268 (4th Cir.
2003) (“While the principles underlying fingerprint identification have not
attained the status of scientific law, they nonetheless bear the imprimatur
of a strong general acceptance, not only in the expert community, but in
the courts as well.”); United States v. Abreu 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2005).
268
. Michael J. Saks, Reliability Standards: Too High, Too Low, or Just
Right? The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially
Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1181 (2003).
267
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Perhaps the most extended discussion of general
acceptance can be found in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Patterson.269
The case was an unusual one in that it dealt both with the
admissibility of latent print individualization testimony in
general and with a particular application known as
“simultaneous impressions.”270 Massachusetts is a mixed
Frye-Daubert jurisdiction, but the decision in Patterson
relied heavily on general acceptance. The court began by
acknowledging that its own ruling in Canavan’s Case271
mandated that the relevant scientific community “be
defined broadly enough to include a sufficiently broad
sample of scientists so that the possibility of disagreement
exists,” not “so narrowly that the expert’s opinion will
inevitably be considered generally accepted.”272 This would
seem to clearly call for extending the relevant scientific
community beyond the narrow confines of practitioners.
At one point, the court appeared to claim that there are
some “scientists” who accept latent print individualization,
naming one: Professor Babler.273 But, as the court
acknowledged, and I noted above, Babler’s research
concerns “the underlying premises of fingerprint
examination,”
not
the
validity
of
latent
print
individualization.274 Indeed, as the court did not mention,
Babler has never made any statement concerning the
269

. 840 N.E.2d 12 (Mass. 2005).
. The details of simultaneous impression identification need not
concern us here, but it consists of aggregating consistent ridge detail
from multiple latent prints when no one of those latent prints has
“sufficient” (“sufficiency” being an undefined concept in latent print
analysis) ridge detail for identification. Such aggregation is, of course,
only legitimate if it is known that the latent prints were laid down by a
single hand—that is, “simultaneously” and not by different hands at
different times. The ability of latent print examiners to distinguish
between simultaneous and non-simultaneous sets of latent prints had
never been measured at the time Patterson was decided, though one pilot
study has now been conducted. John P. Black, Pilot Study: The Application
of ACE-V to Simultaneous (Cluster) Impressions, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
933 (2006).
271
. 733 N.E.2d 1042 (Mass. 2000).
272
. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 25.
273
. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 24 n. 12.
274
. Id.
270
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validity or accuracy of latent print individualization.
In the final analysis, the court did not rely on Babler,
but instead simply excluded all scientists from the relevant
community altogether and limited the community to
practitioners. Directly after acknowledging its own call for
breadth in Canavan’s Case, the court then said:
The judge properly ensured that the technical community in
which latent fingerprint identification and ACE-V is generally
accepted is broad enough to include ‘some practitioners who
acknowledge flaws in the methodology’ and tolerant enough to
allow ‘some, albeit, limited room for dissent.’275

Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s
finding “that both latent fingerprint identification theory in
general and the ACE-V methodology in particular are
generally accepted in the fingerprint examiner community”
because of “the unanimous and long-standing acceptance
of latent fingerprint identification theory.”276 In upholding
the trial court’s finding of “unanimous” acceptance, the
Supreme Court not only sanctioned the exclusion of all nonpractitioners from the “relevant scientific community,” but
also the exclusion of even those practitioners who dared to
doubt that the validity of latent print individualization had
been established, such as Mr. Acree, a latent print examiner
who signed the amicus curiae brief.277 (discussed supra,
Part . Thus, the court’s designation of the “relevant
scientific community” was not really disciplinary, but
merely ideological. Mr. Acree was presumably excluded
from the relevant scientific community not because he
wasn’t a practitioner—he was—but merely because he held
the “wrong” opinion.
However, the court went on to rule that the trial court
did abuse its discretion in admitting latent print evidence
concerning simultaneous impressions. The government did
not make a sufficient showing that simultaneous
impressions were generally accepted within even the latent
print practitioner community. But, even in excluding
simultaneous impressions, the court emphasized its narrow
definition of the relevant scientific community. It explicitly
noted that it is the fingerprint community, not the broader
275
276
277

. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
. Id. at 20.
. See Part III. B. 3. b. supra.
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scientific community, whose “general acceptance” would
be necessary to render simultaneous impression evidence
admissible: “if the Commonwealth establishes that the
application of ACE-V to simultaneous impressions is
generally accepted in the fingerprint examiner community,
the evidence is properly admitted.”278
As evidence of its claim that the practitioner community
was “broad” in and of itself, the court offered the following:
first, “the guidelines and standards developed by the
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study
and Technology (SWGFAST) committees are subject to
repeated discussion, critique, and debate by the entire
SWGFAST community and by members of the IAI
[International Association for Identification].”279 Second,
“[a]dditional room for disagreement lies in the ongoing
debate over how many points of similarity, if any, are
needed to conclusively make a match.”280 Third, the court
noted that some latent print examiners disapprove of the
use of simultaneous impressions, the application of latent
print analysis at issue in Patterson.281
The first assertion is, of course, laughable because the
court has, in its very articulation of the latent print
community’s supposed “breadth” and “tolerance” for
dissent, acknowledged that it is in fact quite clearly a
closed community whose doctrines are not open to
discussion by those who are not either members of the
professional organization or to an elite appointed body,
convened by the FBI, that seeks to set voluntary practice
guidelines for the profession (SWGFAST). The second two
assertions speak to matters of debate within the profession
(the number of points necessary to establish an
individualization
and
the
appropriateness
of
individualization from simultaneous impressions), but not to
the fundamental validity of latent print individualization
itself.
The court conflates a discipline’s commitment to robust
internal debate within the community with the discipline’s
ability to achieve “external validation”—to convince
278
279
280
281

.
.
.
.

Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 29 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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qualified outsiders that the discipline’s claims are true.
Certainly, a court should want to find robust internal
criticism within any expert community seeking to offer
evidence in court. Classically believed to be an
indispensable attribute of a healthy scientific community
(or, for that matter, any community devoted to rational
inquiry whether or not it calls itself “science”), this sort of
open inquiry is supposed to encourage the rigorous testing
of ideas and help eliminate weak claims.282 However, while
internal criticism may be necessary for admissibility under
Frye, it is not sufficient. Astrologers could make an
persuasive showing of robust internal debate by showing
that astrologers disagree as to what particular practices
should be used to answer particular questions, what
particular astrological techniques should be used under
what circumstances, how to interpret various astrological
signs, and so on. But, astrologers cannot demonstrate
external validity. They have not convinced qualified
outsiders—scientists—that the discipline’s claims are true.
In Patterson, the court was able to find evidence of robust
internal debate, but it was able to find no evidence of
external validation.283 The court then fundamentally
282

. Among the thinkers who claimed that such open inquiry was an
ideal of scientific inquiry were the sociologist Robert Merton who called it
“organized skepticism” and the philosopher Karl Popper. ROBERT K. MERTON,
SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: TOWARD THE CODIFICATION OF THEORY AND RESEARCH
(1949); KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (1965).
283
. Indeed, though they are not all in the Patterson record, there are
numerous indicators of the latent print community’s outright hostility to
external validation. See Donald Kennedy, Forensic Science: Oxymoron?,
302 SCIENCE 1625 (2003) (reporting that a National Research Council report
on forensic examination “was dropped because the government insisted
on rights of review that the Academies have, at least in the recent past,
refused to grant a sponsor.”); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 255
(3d Cir. 2004) (claiming to be “deeply discomforted” by credible, through
contested, allegations “that a conspiracy within the Department of Justice
intentionally delayed the release of [a grant] solicitation” for validation
research until after the defendant was convicted.); Itiel E. Dror, Cognitive
Effects and Cognition of Forensic Experts, Presentation to the National
Academies’ Meeting of the Committee on Identifying the Needs of the
Forensic Sciences Community (Dec. 6, 2007) (presentation slides
available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ stl/Forensics.html)
(reporting “attempts to hide/bury/censor” issue of cognitive and
contextual bias in the production of a friction ride Sourcebook by the
National Institute of Justice by removing a commissioned article that had
been favorably peer reviewed from the Sourcebook).
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changed the meaning of the “breadth” principle. Whereas
all the previous discussions of “breath,” including the
court’s own, conceive of breadth as extending the
discussion beyond the practitioner community to the
scientific community, in Patterson breadth has come to be
defined by “tolerance” for dissenting views within the
practitioner community itself.
Even if the court did find that robust internal criticism
could substitute for external validation, what is remarkable
is how underwhelming was the court’s endorsement of the
latent print community’s adherence to this ideal of robust
internal criticism. Far from finding a resounding
commitment to open inquiry, the court characterizes the
latent print community as allowing only “limited room for
dissent.” This rather lukewarm characterization raises more
questions than it answers. What, precisely, did the court
mean when it said that room for dissent is “limited” in the
latent print practitioner community? If it is a scientific
community,
or even
a non-scientific professional
community, why is room for dissent “limited”? If it is a
community that serves the interests of justice, why is room
for dissent “limited”? Why, if fingerprinting is as clear cut,
as accurate, indeed as “infallible” as its proponents claim,
is there a need to “limit” dissent in the practitioner
community anyway? And, if latent print examiners
constitute a community that limits dissent, wouldn’t that be
all the more reason to weigh heavily the opinions of
outsiders and not allow such a community to constitute a
self-certifying “relevant technical community”? Isn’t the
suspicion that a community limits dissent precisely the sort
of situation that necessitates broadening the field of inquiry
in the general acceptance analysis?
Perhaps, in using the term “limited room for dissent,”
the court had in mind some of the statements from latent
print practitioners themselves that may be found in the
exhibits submitted in the Patterson case, attesting to the
prevalence of “dogma” and a “cultish demeanor” within the
latent print community. Perhaps it had in mind Mr.
Ashbaugh’s statement:
In the past the friction ridge identification science has been akin
to a divine following. Challenges were considered heresy and
challengers frequently were accused of chipping at the foundation
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of the science unnecessarily. This cultish demeanor was fostered
by a general deficiency of scientific knowledge, understanding,
and self-confidence within the ranks of identification specialists. A
pervading fear developed in which any negative aspect voiced
that did not support the concept of an exact and infallible science
could lead to its destruction and the destruction of the credibility
of those supporting it.284

Or perhaps this:
The failure of the identification community to challenge or hold
meaningful debate can also be partly attributed to the fact that
the friction ridge identification science has been basically under
the control of the police community rather than the scientific
community. In the eyes of many police administrators, friction
ridge identification is a tool for solving crime, a technical function,
as opposed to a forensic science.285

Or perhaps it had in mind the following statement by Mr.
Grieve, long the editor of the Journal of Forensic
Identification:
[T]his categorical requirement of absolute certainty has no
particular scientific principle but has evolved from a practice
shaped more from allegiance to dogma than a foundation in
science. Once begun, the assumption of absolute certainty as the
only possible conclusion has been maintained by a system of
societal indoctrination, not reason, and has achieved such
ritualistic sanctity that even mild suggestions that its premise
should be re-examined are instantly regarded as acts of
blasphemy. Whatever this may be, it is not science.286

Such statements, coming from the technique’s own
practitioners, would seem to make the latent print
community a poor choice for a practitioner community that
is permitted to “self-validate” its own claims and exclude
outsiders from the assessment of these claims. In sum, the
Patterson decision is unconvincing because the court
allowed admissibility to rest upon internal criticism instead
of the external validation it demanded in Canavan’s Case
and allowed it to rest upon an extremely weak finding of
commitment to robust internal criticism at that.

284

. DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY, 4 (1999).
285
. Id.
286
. David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521,
528 (1996) (describing “shock” and “disbelief” “within the forensic
science community” at the results of the 1995 test).
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In 2007 in State v. Rose, the trial court in a capital
murder trial ruled latent print evidence inadmissible under
Maryland’s Frye standard.287 The ruling marks the first
wholesale exclusion of latent print evidence since the
earliest challenge in 1999 in a case in which the
government put on a case in response to an admissibility
challenge.288 It is perhaps significant that the government’s
case consisted solely of testimony from a practitioner. The
government did not refer to any non-practitioner scientists
who accept the claim that latent print individualization is
valid.
This ruling raises interesting implications relevant to my
discussion here. On the one hand, it supports my
suggestion that latent print individualization may have
survived its Daubert trials only to end up in the “Fryeing
pan.” Further, it may contradict the conventional wisdom
that Daubert is a more stringent admissibility threshold
than Frye, especially for unpopular litigants with unpopular
causes.289 The government’s recent decision to refile the
case in federal court would seem to support this
interpretation.290 If this tactic succeeds, it could lead to the
rather awkward conclusion that expert evidence that
cannot satisfy that admissibility requirements of the
Maryland state courts is nonetheless welcome in the federal
courts. It, moreover, evokes the rather surprising notion
that latent print evidence, once called “the very archetype
of reliable expert testimony,”291 must forum shop in order to
287

. State v. Rose, Case No. K06-0545 (Md. Balt. Co. Cir. Oct. 19,
2007). The author was a consultant to the defendant in this case.
288
. In Patterson v. Commissioner, 40 N.E.2d 12 (Mass. 2005), only
simultaneous impressions were ruled inadmissible. In Virgin Islands v.
Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933 (D. Virgin Islands 1986), latent print evidence
was excluded after an admissibility challenge in which the government
failed to put on a case. As mentioned previously, in Pennsylvania, latent
print examiners conclusions were limited in Llera Plaza I, until the court
reversed itself.
289
. Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining
“Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed
Amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV.
317 (2000) (Finding that Daubert is, in fact, more stringent than Frye.).
290
. Brent Jones, Man Indicted by Federal Grand Jury in 2006 Killing at
Mall, BALT. SUN, Apr. 2, 2008, at 2B.
291
. United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind.
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get into evidence.
This article has focused on the neglected issue of the
admissibility of latent print evidence in Frye jurisdictions.
While this should be of importance to those wrestling with
the admissibility of latent print (and other forensic)
evidence in those jurisdictions, the research reported here
has implications that go beyond Frye jurisdictions and go
beyond latent print evidence. The process of applying Frye
to a single form of evidence has focused our attention on a
number of important principles that should apply for Frye
analyses of any evidence, including the problems with
practitioner-only evidence, the importance of breadth, and
the challenges of constituting a relevant scientific
community for techniques like latent print identification
whose testimonial claims are not obviously within the
domain of any particular scientific discipline. I will explore
some of these further implications below.

A. IMPLICATIONS

FOR

DAUBERT JURISDICTIONS

As I have noted above, I have turned my attention from
Daubert to Frye only reluctantly, due to my strong belief, a
belief shared by the overwhelming bulk of legal scholarship
on the issue, that latent print individualization evidence
does not satisfy any reasonable application of Daubert.292
Nonetheless, the argument presented here for exclusion of
latent print individualization evidence under the Frye rule
may yet be of some relevance for consideration of the
same evidence under the Daubert standard. Daubert still
incorporates the general acceptance standard as one of the
five factors designed to assess its “reliability” requirement.
Thus, the case presented here demonstrates clearly that
latent print individualization evidence fails to satisfy at least
one of the five Daubert factors, and, moreover, it fails to
satisfy the factor that it has widely been assumed it would
have easiest time satisfying.

2000).
292
. Most evidence scholars who have addressed the issue agree that
if Daubert has any meaning at all, it must preclude the admission of
evidence that cannot demonstrate reliability. See, citations in note 241,
supra.
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Although Daubert is frequently criticized, relatively few
scholars, principally Professor Schwartz, have gone so far
as to argue that Frye is actually preferable.293 Should this
case study change our view on this question?
I have previously argued that, in the understanding of
the scientific basis of latent print individualization, Daubert
has had a transformative effect.294 What is probably the
principal flaw in the arguments vouching for latent print
individualization—the confusion between uniqueness and
accuracy that I have labeled the “fingerprint examiner’s
fallacy”—was not clearly enunciated until after the Daubert
decision.295 It would not be going too far to suggest that
Daubert had a salutary effect on the understanding of the
scientific basis underlying latent print individualization
merely by prompting a renewed look at the evidence after
nearly a century of “general acceptance.”
In addition, of course, Daubert’s focus on reliability
sharpened the questions that were asked and focused
attention of the crucial, and hitherto neglected, issue of
validity. That pilot accuracy studies are now being
undertaken, after a century of use of the technique in court,
may to some extent be ascribed to the influence of
Daubert.296 Thus, the principal merit of Daubert has been
symbolic in compelling various legal system actors to look
more closely and more searchingly at many types of
evidence that have long been taken for granted. But these
searching inquiries have not necessarily generated rigorous
admissibility rulings.
As
demonstrated
above,
Daubert’s
celebrated
vagueness has essentially allowed trial judges free rein to
rule according to their instincts. One undervalued virtue of
Frye is that, however vague it may be, it is less vague than
293

. Schwartz, supra note 33.
. Simon A. Cole, Jackson Pollack, Judge Pollak, and the Dilemma of
Fingerprint Expertise, in EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAW 98 (Edmond ed.,
2004).
295
. See David A. Stoney, Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 55 (Faigman,
et al. eds., 1997); Fred Woodworth, A Printer Looks at Fingerprints, MATCH!,
Winter, 1997, at 36.
296
. Kasey Wertheim et al., A Report of Latent Print Examiner Accuracy
During Comparison Training Exercises, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 55 (2006).
294
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Daubert. At some point, the existence of general
acceptance becomes difficult to fudge, especially if the
principles enunciated above, against practitioner-only
acceptance and for breadth, are adhered to. My principal
reason for skepticism about Professor Schwartz’s embrace
of Frye lay in my sense that it would be too receptive to
closed communities, despite Professor Schwartz’s and some
courts’ efforts call for a broad interpretation of Frye. It
would appear, however, that applying Frye’s notion of the
“relevant scientific community” is not necessarily any more
difficult than applying Daubert’s notion of reliability.
This discussion would seem to support the emerging
scholarly view that Frye and Daubert are not as different as
scholars have previously assumed. Most evidence that fails
Daubert should probably fail Frye and vice versa. Indeed,
this case study shows that even one of Professor Saks’s
prime examples of a technique that satisfied Frye and failed
Daubert297 actually fails Frye too. The difficulties appear to
lie not so much with which admissibility standard is chosen,
but in operationalizing either standard in an even-handed
manner.298

C. THE CLASH

OF THE

LEGAL

AND

SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES

By showing the lack of general acceptance of the
validity of latent print individualization, this articles raise a
larger issue that transcends the narrow question of legal
admissibility: the disconnect between the legal and
scientific communities as concerns the validity of latent
print individualization. The evidence assembled above
clearly demonstrates that members of the scientific
community do not accept that the validity of latent print
individualization has been established. In the course of
demonstrating that latent print individualization lacks
general acceptance, this article has demonstrated the more
important fact that only with difficulty can the government
produce any non-practitioner scientists who accept the
297

. Saks, supra note 42.
. See generally Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert
Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59 (2005); Susan Haack, Trial and Error:
The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S66
(2005); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000).
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claim that latent print individualization is valid. And yet,
paradoxically, few courts have acknowledged this
deficiency, and those that have have tended to deem it
irrelevant to admissibility.299 Most courts have tended to
uphold the admissibility of latent print individualization with
ringing pronouncements about its validity. As I have noted
elsewhere, these pronouncements have come to stand in
for scientific validation when proponents of latent print
individualization are called upon to justify their claims. 300
Indeed, courts have essentially become the “relevant
scientific community” for latent print evidence, a fact they
sometimes inadvertently acknowledge when they discuss
“general acceptance” in the “judicial communit[y]” as if it
were something conferred by courts themselves, rather
than by an external expert community.301 What might
“acceptance” in the “judicial communit[y]” mean, other
than following precedent? Such reasoning turns a Frye
analysis into an exercise in following legal precedent, rather
than the deference to an external expert community that
stands at the heart of Frye.302 Moreover, courts’ upholding
of the admissibility of latent print evidence has required
them to essentially deem irrelevant the views of the
scientific community.
It is difficult to think of comparable examples of
scientific issues upon which the legal and scientific
communities stand in such stark and
dramatic
disagreement. Will courts continue to hold out against the
299

. United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Ky. 2003);
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004); Llera Plaza II, 188
F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
300
. Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility
Ruling from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1189 (2004).
301
. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d. 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003)
(discussing “general acceptance, not only in the expert community, but in
the courts as well”); Id. at 269 (referring to “the consensus of the expert
and judicial communities that the fingerprint identification technique is
reliable.”); Megan J. Erickson, Daubert’s Bipolar Treatment of Scientific
Expert
Testimony—From
Frye’s
Polygraph
to
Farwell’s
Brain
Fingerprinting, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 809 (2007) (“The courts willingly
overlook the subjectivity inherent in latent fingerprint evidence testimony
because of what the court considers to be its own ‘general acceptance’
(even if ‘general acceptance’ means within the judicial community, rather
than scientific community).”).
302
. Giannelli, supra note 10, at 1218–19.
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view of the scientific community? Will the scientific
community become more aggressively interventionist? The
recent formation of a panel on forensic science by the
National Academies, the most prestigious and credible
scientific organization in the United States, raises the
possibility of a more forceful intervention on behalf of the
scientific community.303 But whether and to what extent the
panel will directly address the issue of validity remains to
be seen.

***

303

. The National Academies, Committee on Science, Technology, and
the Law, http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/Forensics.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2008).

